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You seek for knowledge and wisdom, as I once did,· and I ardently hope 
that the gratification of your wishes may not be a serpent to sting you, as 
mine has been. 1 
INTRODUCTION 
So began Victor Frankenstein's recounting of his life story to Robert Walton. Haunted by the monster that he had created, Frankenstein warned Walton of the dangers of blind fealty to 
science. More than just a modem day horror story, Shelley's novel serves 
as a warning of the dangers associated with an unrestrained search for 
1 MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN 17 (J. Paul Hunter ed., 1996). The excerpted 
language is taken from Shelley's 1818, not 1831, edition of Frankenstein. 
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knowledge. Frankenstein's monster personifies the perils of scientific 
tampering with the natural order. 
The Frankenstein imagery lingers just below the surface of the current 
debate on cloning. In early 1997, the first adult mammalian clone was born, 
generating an enormous public outcry about the dangers of unrestrained 
scientific inquiry.2 Subsequently named Dolly, her birth broke new 
scientific ground. At the same time, it tapped into a societal uneasiness 
about the proper limits of scientific inquiry. Scientific discoveries do not 
unfold in a vacuum. They play out against a cultural backdrop in which 
both fantasy and reality are intertwined. Tampering with the process of 
creation, whether it be in the form of assisted reproductive technology, 
genetic testing, or, at its most extreme, cloning, plays on "profound 
concerns regarding the nature of humankind and its relationship to other 
aspects of the natural world."3 
It came as no surprise, then, that both Congress and numerous state 
legislatures hastily drafted new legislation banning various forms of 
cloning and withdrawing or restricting funds from certain types of 
scientific projects involving cloning.4 Within three weeks ofDolly's birth, 
the United States Senate held hearings addressing the challenges posed by 
cloning technology.5 President Clinton also acted quickly. One day after 
scientists announced Dolly's birth, President Clinton penned a letter to Dr. 
Harold Shapiro, the Chair of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission 
(''NBAC"), asking the Commission to report back to him after having 
''undertake[n] a thorough review of the legal and ethical issues associated 
with the use of this [cloning] technology."6 Upon receiving the NBAC's 
report, President Clinton sent to Congress the Cloning Prohibition Act of 
2 SeeGINAKOLATA,CLONE:THEROADTODOLLYANDTHEPATHAHEAD34-35 
(1998) ("The World Health Organization said it opposed the cloning of humans. 
The Humane Society opposed the cloning of animals. The American Society of 
Reproductive Medicine issued a press release saying it 'finds the practice ofhuman 
cloning .•. unacceptable.' "). 
3 NATIONALBIOETHICSADVISORYCOMM'N, CLONINGHUMANBEINGS:REPORT 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OFTHENATIONALBIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION 6 
(1997) [hereinafter CLONING HUMAN BEINGS] (footnote omitted). 
4 See infra notes 146-47,205-07. 
5 See Examining Scientific Discoveries in Cloning, Focusing on Challenges for 
Public Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Health and Safety of the 
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 1 05th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter 
Cloning Hearing]. 
6 CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at Letter from the President. 
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1997 ("CPA"), 7 which bans the use of somatic cell nuclear transfer, the 
technology used to create Dolly.8 
Congress has not yet enacted legislation banning or regulating cloning. 
Any anti-cloning legislation raises a number of important constitutional 
issues:9 This Article addresses two of those issues. First, does Congress 
have the power pursuant to the Commerce Clause to ban or regulate 
cloning? Second, even if the Commerce Clause does empower Congress to 
prohibit all or some forms of cloning, is such a prohibition an unwarranted 
government intrusion on a fundamental right, so as to violate the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment? 
Part I of this Article begins with a description of the science of cloning 
and concludes with a history of cloning research, both of which provide a 
much needed perspective on the current national debate over cloning. Part 
II summarizes the President's proposed cloning legislation, as well as the 
bills introduced in Congress since February of 1997, when Dolly's birth 
was announced. The quality of the drafting of these proposals suggests 
caution, because poorly crafted legislation leads to unintended conse-
quences. Part ill examines the federal response to cloning in the context of 
Supreme Court Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Part ill concludes that 
Congress may ban cloning pursuant to its power to regulate interstate 
commerce, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's recent decision in United 
States v. Lopez.1° Finally, Part IV provides an analysis of the Supreme 
Court's substantive due process cases involving the right of personal 
privacy. The trends in the Court's case hiw strongly suggest that a majority 
of the current Court would hold that a federal government ban on cloning 
would not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Although 
th~ reasoning used by individual Justices may vary, it is likely that a 
majority of the current Court would conclude that the right to use and have 
access to cloning technology is not a fundamental right protected by the 
Constitution. 
7 CLONING PROHIBITION ACT OF 1997, H.R. DOC. No. 105-97 (1997). 
8 See infra notes 50-56 and accompanying text 
9 This Article addresses only some of the issues raised by the federal regulation 
of cloning. For example, most of the federal anti-cloning bills do not address the 
preemption issue. It is an open question whether states could regulate cloning in a 
more restrictive fashion than federal law. Several states have adopted anti-cloning 
legislation, and bills have been introduced in a number of state legislatures. See 
infra notes 205-07. 
10 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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I. THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF GENETICS AND CLONING 
The birth of Dolly made the term "cloning" a part of everyday 
language, yet scientists have engaged in various forms of animal and 
human cell cloning for several decades. Why did these earlier experiments 
not generate the public outcry that followed Dolly's birth? The reason is 
that Dolly's birth opened the door to the possibility of cloning an entire 
human being from the somatic11 cell of an adult human. In order to 
understand the current public debate over cloning, it is important to 
understand how genetic information is transmitted in normal human 
reproduction, how cloning alters that process, and how scientific inquiry 
and exploration brought society to the ethical crossroads it now faces. 
A. Human Reproduction12 
The cornerstone of human reproduction is deoxyribonucleic acid 
(''DNA"). DNA consists of two extremely long strands of nucleotides 
coiled around each other in what is known as a "double helix.'m A 
nucleotide consists of three components: (1) one of four bases: adenine, 
guanine, cytidine, or thymidine; (2) a sugar; and (3) a phosphate. Because 
adenine pairs only with thymidine and guanine pairs only with cytidine, the 
bases on one strand of the DNA attract the complementary bases on the 
other strand, resulting in the double helix formation. The importance of 
DNA lies in these bases along the strands of the double helix. They create 
a code for different types of proteins, and these proteins, in turn, are 
11 There are two categories of cells in the human body: (1) somatic and (2) germ 
line. All of the cells in the body, except for the human reproductive cells, i.e., ovum 
and sperm cells, are somatic cells. Germ cells are the human reproductive cells. See 
Dennis S. Karjala,A Legal Research Agenda for the Human Genome Initiative, 32 
JURIMETRICS J. 121, 133 (1992). 
12 The explanation in the text outlines the process of DNA and cell duplication 
provided in an earlier paper. See Anne Lawton, Regulating Genetic Destiny: A 
Comparative Study of Legal Constraints in Europe and the United States, 11 
EMORY INT'L L. REv. 365, 369-71 (1997). For a complete explanation of genetic 
inheritance, see Robert P. Wagner, Understanding Inheritance, in THE HUMAN 
GENOME PROJECT: DECIPHERING THE BLUEPRINT OF HEREDITY 2-67 (Necia Grant 
Coopered., 1994) [hereinafter HUMAN GENOME PROJECT]. 
13 The double helix has been described as resembling "two-ply embroidery 
floss, [which] is composed of two strands coiled helically about a common axis." 
Wagner, supra note 12, at 38. 
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responsible for the manifestation of different human traits or genetic 
characteristics.14 
Each human cell contains DNA. Without DNA, cell duplication and 
human growth could not occur. One cell becomes two through a process in 
which DNA replicates itself.15 The process begins when the two strands of 
the double helix separate or unwind. The bases on each individual strand 
attract their complementary bases, for example, adenine pairs with 
thymidine. Eventually, two double helices result, both copies of the original 
double helix. The original cell then divides into two cells, each \vith its own 
complement of double-stranded DNA. 16 
The double-stranded DNA in the body's cells is "subdivided into 
specific stretches or regions called genes.'m "A gene is essentially a section 
of a DNA molecule that codes for (directs) the production of protein 
products used by the organism to build up and repair its various parts, 
catalyze metabolic processes, or even regulate the activity of other 
genes.''18 The genes, in turn, are arranged along rodlike structures called 
chromosomes.19 In the somatic cells, chromosomes are paired. In the 
human body, each somatic cell contains forty-six, or twenty-three pairs, of 
chromosomes.2° Chromosomes are not paired in the germ cells, i.e., the 
ovum and the sperm; thus, germ cells contain a total of only twenty-three 
chromosomes.21 
The sperm fertilizes the ovum during sexual reproduction, causing each 
germ cell to contribute one set of twenty-three chromosomes. Fertilization 
begins when the egg and sperm fuse, creating a one-celled organism, 
known as the zygote. That one-celled organism, however, contains two 
nucleF2-one from the sperm and one from the egg-labeled as pronuclei by 
scientists.23 However, the two nuclei do not fuse at the zygote stage. 
14 See Karjala, supra note 11, at 129, 136-37. 
15 See Wagner, supra note 12, at 42-43 (discussing DNA replication). 
16 See id. 
17 KARLDRLICA, UNDERSTANDINGDNAANDGENECLONING:AGUIDEFOR THE 
CURIOUS 4 {1984). 
ts Karjala, supra note 11, at 129. 
19 See id. at 133. 
20 See Wagner, supra note 12, at 12. 
21 See Karjala, supra note 11, at 133. 
22 Nuclei is the plural of nucleus, "the cell structure that houses the chromo-
somes, and thus the genes." CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, app. at 3. 
Typically, human cells contain only one nucleus. 
23 Scientists use the term "pronuclei" to refer to the sperm and egg nuclei 
because each contains only 23 chromosomes, half the genetic complement of an 
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What actually happens is that the chromosomes in the two pronuclei 
duplicate themselves separately, and then copies from each come together 
inside the actual nuclei formed after the first cell division. It is within 
each of the two nuclei present in the two-cell emb:tyo that a complete set 
of forty-six human chromosomes commingle for the first time. Fertiliza-
tion is now complete.24 
283 
This two-celled organism is called an embryo or a pre-embryo.25 The 
embryo contains two pairs of twenty-three chromosomes, one set from each 
genetic parent, comprising the necessary forty-six chromosomes required 
in somatic cells. Genetic diversity results from this pairing of chromosomes 
from each parent. Any child born through sexual reproduction differs 
genetically from both of the child's parents because the child's genetic 
make-up is a combination of traits inherited from both parents.26 
adult human. 
24 LEE M. SILVER, REMAKING EDEN: CLONING AND BEYOND IN A BRAVE NEW 
WORLD 38 (1997). 
25 The American Fertility Society uses the term "pre-emb:tyo." See Ethics 
Comm. of the Am. Fertility Soc'y,Ethical Considerations of Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies, 62 FERTILITY & STERILITY 30S (Supp. 1 1994) [hereinafter Ethical 
Considerations]. Others criticize the use of the term "pre-emb:tyo." 
The term pre-emb:tyo has been embraced wholeheartedly by IVF [in vitro 
fertilization] practitioners for reasons that are political, not scientific. The 
new term is used to provide the illusion that there is something profoundly 
different between what we nonmedical biologists still call a six-day-old 
emb:tyo and what we and eve:tyone else call a sixteen-day-old emb:tyo. 
SILVER, supra note 24, at 39. George J. Annas, the Edward R. Utley Professor of 
Public Health Law at Boston University School of Public Health, argues that the 
American Fertility Society created the term "pre-emb:tyo" to define out of existence 
the problem ofiVF practitioners manipulating emb:tyos during IVF procedures. 
[T]he AFS Ethics Committee opted to "solve" their members' problem by 
redefinition. The Committee decided that extracorporeal human emb:tyos 
were not really emb:tyos at all, but were "preembcyos," an invented term for 
what had previously been called preimplantation emb:tyos .... All this 
would seem unimportant wordplay, except that redefining the 
preimplantation emb:tyo as a nonemb:tyo permitted the committee to advise 
its members that anything goes with these now nonemb:tyos .... 
George J. Annas, Regulatory Models for Human Embryo Cloning: The Free 
Market, Professional Guidelines, and Government Restrictions, 4 KENNEDY INST. 
ETHICS J. 234, 242 (1994). 
26 Children born through sexual reproduction differ genetically from both 
parents for two reasons. First, as discussed in the text, each parent contributes only 
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1. Cloning 
Cloning also involves the transmission of genetic information from 
"parent" to "offspring." Unlike sexual reproduction, however, cloning 
replicates the genetic information of only one parent so that the offspring 
is an exact genetic copy of that parent. All forms of cloning involve the 
creation of "a precise genetic copy of a molecule, cell, plant, animal, or 
human being.'m As a result, unlike sexual reproduction, cloning has the 
potential for reducing genetic diversity. 
However, not all forms of cloning implicate the legal and ethical issues 
raised by the creation of an adult mammal, such as Dolly. In fact, the term 
"cloning," when applied to animals, actually encompasses four different 
scientific processes: (1) molecular or gene cloning; (2) cellular cloning; (3) 
blastomere separation or embryo splitting; and ( 4) nuclear transplantation 
cloning.28 Of these four processes, only embryo splitting and nuclear 
transplantation cloning raise concerns about the creation of adult human 
clones. 
a. Molecular Cloning 
Molecular cloning is the process of replicating sections of DNA. 
Because DNA is a molecule and genes are regions on the DNA molecule, 
23 chromosomes to the child, one-half of the child's total genetic material. 
Second, during the process of gamete production, crossing over occurs, creating 
new configurations of genes on the chromosomes within the parents' germ cells. 
Each parent contributes 23 chromosomes through his or her germ cell. Germ cells 
are produced from 46-chromosome cells in a process known as meiosis. During 
meiosis, certain segments of some pairs of chromosomes switch places, or "cross 
over." Suppose the mother has a pair of chromosomes numbered 1 and 2, with 
genes located on Segment A of Chromosome 1 and Segment B of Chromosome 2. 
Meiosis, in which the mother's egg cells are produced, splits up the 23 pairs of 
chromosomes resulting in a total of23 chromosomes. If there is no crossing over, 
then Egg Cell #1 has Chromosome 1 with Segment A, and Egg Cell #2 has 
Chromosome 2 with Segment B. Suppose crossing over occurs. Then, Segment A 
changes place with Segment B. As a result, Egg Cell #1 now has Chromosome 1, 
but with Segment B, not Segment A, on it Thus, crossing over increases diversity 
in a species because the reproductive cells may have chromosomes in which genes 
have relocated on the chromosomes or chromosomes in which there has been no 
relocation. Children born of sexual union may inherit either type of chromosomal 
arrangement. For a more detailed discussion of meiosis and crossing over, see 
Wagner, supra note 12, at 31-36. 
27 CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 13. 
28 See id. at 14-15. 
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some scientists refer to this process of replicating portions of DNA as 
molecular cloning29 while others dub it gene cloning.30 The production of 
insulin for diabetics provides an example of how molecular cloning has 
made possible a host of medical and scientific breakthroughs.31 
Insulin regulates the metabolism of sugar in the human body. Most 
people produce insulin in their bodies so they have no problem in 
regulating their bodies' metabolism of sugar. Diabetics, however, either do 
not produce insulin or do so in amounts insufficient to monitor their 
bodies' use of sugar. Thus, diabetics must take insulin. Before molecular 
cloning, scientists had to obtain insulin from hog pancreases, which was 
expensive and yielded limited supplies of insulin.32 Today, molecular 
cloning allows scientists to produce large amounts of insulin at a lower 
cost.33 
The first step in the molecular cloning of insulin (or any substance) is 
locating the region or gene on the DNA that codes for insulin. Once the 
gene is located, scientists must retrieve that gene from the DNA. In order 
to do so, scientists must break open the cell and its nucleus and remove the 
DNA. Then, they excise the gene or section of the DNA that codes for 
insulin production. The second step involves splicing the insulin gene into 
a cloning vector or vehicle. Cloning vectors "are relatively short DNA 
molecules that can penetrate the wall of a living cell and can multiply 
inside that cell."34 The end product of this process is a recombinant DNA 
molecule35 composed or bacterial cell DNA on which the human gene for 
29 See id. at 14; Lany L. Deaven, DNA Libraries: Recombinant Clones for 
Mapping and Sequencing, in HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra note 12, at 219, 
219-20. 
30 See DRLICA, supra note 17, at 2. 
31 See id. at 9. 
32 See id. 
33 See id. 
34 Id. at 6-7 (stating that cloning vector DNA comes from bacterial cells). 
35 A recombinant DNA molecule is "[a] stretch of DNA that includes DNA 
from more than one source and can be replicated by a host cell without being 
incorporated into the genome of the host cell." HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra 
note 12, at 336. Recombinant DNA technology created an uproar in the 1970s 
because the technology allowed scientists to combine DNA from different 
organisms. There was concern that scientists might create toxic organisms capable 
of causing death or other serious damage. Scientists participated in a voluntary 
moratorium on recombinant DNA research while scientists and government 
officials studied the implications of this new technology. See CLONING HUMAN 
BEINGS, supra note 3, at 5. 
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insulin is located. The recombinant DNA molecule is then inserted into a 
host cell, typically a yeast or bacteria cell. Yeast and bacteria cells multiply 
quickly,36 producing many duplicate yeast or bacteria cells, all with nuclei 
containing copies of the recombinant DNA molecule. Because the host cell 
DNA contains a gene for producing insulin, the host cell (and all of its 
numerous copies) now can produce insulin.37 
Thus, molecular cloning allows scientists to insert particular genes into 
the DNA of simple organisms, such as bacteria, and create multiple copies 
of the altered DNA. The technology has numerous scientific and medical 
applications, including the production of insulin, as described above, and 
other medicines, such as erythropoietin, which doctors use to treat anemia 
resulting from kidney dialysis, and tissue plasminogen activator (tP A), 
which dissolves blood clots resulting from heart attacks.38 
b. Cell Cloning 
Cell cloning involves duplication of any of the somatic cells of the 
human body.39 One cell is cultured and duplicated in the laboratory, 
producing a cell line composed of identical copies of the original somatic 
cell.40 Having multiple copies of one cell allows scientists to test the impact 
of certain medicines on these cells before testing drugs on live human 
subjects.41 
Today, recombinant DNA research operates within guidelines established by 
the National Institutes ofHealth. The guidelines focus on containment of organisms 
to the laboratory and place the responsibility for monitoring on the institutions 
involved in the research. See Recombinant DNA Research: Actions Under the 
Guidelines, 62 Fed. Reg. 4782 (1997); Recombinant DNA Research: Actions 
Under the Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. 10,004 (1996); Recombinant DNA Research: 
Actions Under the Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. 1482 (1996); Recombinant DNA 
Research: Actions Under the Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 20,726 (1995); Recombinant 
DNA Research: Actions Under the Guidelines, 59 Fed. Reg. 40,170 (1994); 
Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, 59 Fed. Reg. 
34,496 (1994). 
36 See DRLICA, supra note 17, at 18. 
37 The insulin example in the text is an elaboration on an example used in 
DRLICA, supra note 17, at 9. 
38 See CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 14. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. 
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c. Blastomere Separation or Embryo Splitting 
Blastomere separation, commonly known as embryo splitting, differs 
in kind, not just degree, from other forms of cloning because its goal is the 
production of live adult animal (or potentially human) clones. Essentially, 
blastomere separation creates multiple copies of a single embryo, thus 
artificially mimicking the natural process that results in twins or multiple 
births. 
Blastomere separation begins with the fertilization of an egg by a 
sperm. Approximately a day and a half after fertilization,42 the one-celled 
fertilized egg begins to divide. A blastomere is simply "each of the cells 
produced when the fertilized egg cleaves into 2, then 4, 8, and 16 cells."43 
Cell divisions continue, forming the blastocyst about four days after 
fertilization. The significance of the blastocyst is that each ofits cells-the 
blastomeres-is totipotent, "possess[ing] the total potential to make an entire 
new organism.'>44 Only very early embryonic cells have this capacity, if 
separated, to each develop into a completely formed adult animal or human 
organism. As the embryo develops, the cells begin to differentiate or 
develop the characteristics of specialized cells, such as muscle, heart, and 
liver cells. Although the birth of Dolly suggests that differentiated cells 
may be used to create adult clones, it is much easier to create an adult clone 
using cells that have not yet undergone differentiation.45 
Because of differentiation, blastomere separation usually occurs with 
embryos ranging in size from two to eight cells. An example using an adult 
sheep demonstrates how the process works. First, scientists remove and 
fertilize ·an ovum from an adult sheep. After fertilization, the egg divides. 
Suppose scientists decide to break apart the embryo at the four-cell stage. 
This results in four blastomeres. Each of these blastomeres is then cultured 
to grow into a multiple-cell embryo, which is reimplanted into an adult 
female sheep. If four embryos result from the four blastomeres, four adult 
sheep, all identical copies of one another, will be born. 
Blastomere separation is not science fiction. Scientists already have 
created adult animal clones from a single animal embryo. They began these 
experiments in "artificial twinning" almost twenty years ago and have had 
42 See ALAN TROUNSON & DAVID K. GARDNER, HANDBOOK OF IN VITRO 
FERTILIZATION 69 (1993). 
43 CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, app. at 1. 
44 Id. at 15. 
45 See id. at 15-16. 
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success in producing normal adult sheep and cows.46 Five years ago, a team 
of scientists at George Washington University Medical Center created the 
first human embryonic clones.47 Scientists were most successful in cloning 
when beginning with two-celled embryos.48 However, none of the human 
embryos created by blastomere separation was allowed to develop for more 
than six days.49 
d. Nuclear Transplantation Cloning 
Both blastomere separation and nuclear transplantation cloning create 
the potential for developing adult animal or human clones, yet the birth of 
Dolly through nuclear transplantation cloning created a public furor 
unmatched by the announcement of the first case of embryo cloning. 50 
The difference between blastomere separation andnucleartransplanta-
tion cloning really is one of degree. Blastomere separation requires a 
breaking apart of the early embryo and culturing the blastomeres until they 
develop into individual embryos. Nuclear transplantation cloning can be 
done with either embryonic cells or fully differentiated adult animal or 
(potentially) human cells. 51 
In Dolly's case, a team of scientists headed by Dr. Ian Wilmut and Dr. 
Keith Campbell of the Roslin Institute in Scotland removed mammary 
gland cells from an adult sheep. They cultured the mammary gland cells to 
facilitate replication. 52 The scientists then removed the nuclei from the ova 
of adult sheep, leaving enucleated eggs, 53 and inserted the nuclei from the 
adult mammary gland cells into the enucleated eggs. Dr. Wilmut and Dr. 
Campbell tried this experiment 277 times. In twenty-nine cases, the eggs 
with the mammary gland nuclei developed into sheep embryos. 54 Of these 
reconstituted embryos, only one adult sheep was born, named Dolly,55 
46 See KOLATA, supra note 2, at 175-78. 
47 See Kathy A. Fackelmann, Researchers 'Clone' Human Embryos, 144 SCI. 
NEWS 276, 276 (1993). 
48 See id. 
49 See id. 
50 See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text. 
51 See CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 15-16. 
52 See id. at 22. 
53 An enucleated egg is "an egg from which the nucleus has been removed." I d. 
app. at2. 
54 See id. at 22. 
55 Dolly originally was named "6LL3." George J. Annas, Edward RUtley 
Professor of Public Health Law at Boston University School of Public Health, 
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which was an identical copy of the sheep that had contributed its mammary 
gland cell for nuclear transplantation. 56 
B. How Did We Get Here?51 
1. A Brief History of Cloning 
Scientists did not set out to clone human beings. Scientific interest in 
cloning arose out of curiosity about the intricacies of human development, 
and dates backmorethan a hundred years to the latter part of the nineteenth 
century.58 At that time, embryologists began experimenting with frog eggs 
in order to study embryological development. 59 Because frogs produce 
thousands of eggs at a time and those eggs are much larger than human 
eggs, frog eggs were ideal candidates for the study of embryological 
believes that Dr. Wilmot may have named the adult sheep clone ''Dolly" in order 
to make nuclear transplantation cloning appear less threatening: 
Instead of naming Dolly by the scientific name used in the scientific 
article-that is, "6LL3"-a name that would imply not an individual, but a 
manufactured product, use of the word "Dolly" and the name "Dolly" 
actually demystifies this whole concept and makes it look like a "doll," a 
manufactured product to be sure, but yet one that brings great joy to 
children and one that is not at all threatening to the human race. 
Cloning Hearing, supra note 5, at 42 (statement of George J. Annas, Edward R 
Utley Professor ofPublic Health Law, Boston University School ofPublic Health) 
(emphasis added). Wilmutdubbedher''Dolly" because she was created from udder 
cells, the sheep's mammary glands. "In a moment of frivolity, as a wry joke, 
Wilmot named her Dolly after Dolly Parton, who also was known, he said, for her 
mammaries." KOLATA, supra note 2, at 3. 
56 For a more detailed explanation of the steps involved in nuclear trans-
plantation cloning, see CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 15-22. See also 
Gina Kolata, With Cloning of a Sheep, the Ethical Ground Shifts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
24, 1997, at AI [hereinafter Ethical Shift] (describing the basis of Dr. Wilmot's 
nuclear transplantation cloning procedure and debating the ethical implications of 
such cloning); Whatever Next?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 1, 1997, at 79 (describing Dr. 
Wilmot's unique use of certain cells to produce a nuclear transplantation clone and 
discussing the potential problems with the ability of a clone to age or remain 
healthy). 
51 This discussion of the evolution of scientific inquiry in the field of cloning 
is drawn largely from KOLATA, supra note 2, and CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra 
note 3, at 13-22. 
58 See KOLATA, supra note 2, at 43. 
59 See id. at 44. 
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development.60 Embryologists had large supplies to fertilize, and the eggs 
were large enough such that scientists did not require microscopes in order 
to observe developmental stages in the frog embryo.61 
The developing frog embryos led embryologists to wonder about the 
process of development from fertilized egg to differentiated cells, e.g., 
skin, brain, and heart cells, in a multi-cell organism.62 What triggered the 
differentiation of cells? If an early embryo, for example at the four-cell 
stage, were divided into its four constituent cells, would four identical 
embryos develop? Or would only partial embryos develop because each of 
the four cells already had begun the process of differentiation? And, why 
could the process of differentiation of cells not be reversed? 
In 1885, August Weismann, a zoology and comparative anatomy 
professor at the University of Freiberg, developed a theory to account for 
differentiation. 63 He argued that as the fertilized egg divided, the resulting 
cells lost genetic information with each cell division. According to his 
theory, the fertilized egg started with the full complement of genetic 
material; however, with each successive cell division, more genetic 
information was lost.64 Weismann theorized that the loss of genetic 
information explained how cells ended up performing certain functions. 
The genes remaining in the cell's nucleus after cell division controlled 
specific functions, e.g., brain activity. The loss of other genetic information 
explained why the cell could perform only certain types of functions, i.e., 
why the cell had differentiated. 65 
In the early 1900s, Hans Spemann, a Nobel Prize winning embryolo-
gist, disproved Weismann's theory.66 Spemann took the fertilized egg of a 
salamander and, using a hair from his son's head, created a noose around 
the middle of the egg.67 The "hair noose" forced the fertilized egg into a 
dumbbell shape, with the nucleus of the egg on only one side of the noose. 
Spemann watched as only the side with the nucleus engaged in cell 
division. When that side reached the sixteen-cell stage, Spemann opened 
the "hair noose," allowing a cell (with a nucleus) from the sixteen-cell 
60 See id. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. at 45. 
63 See id. at 50. 
64 See id. at 51. 
65 See id. 
66 See id. at 57. 
67 See id. at 57-58. 
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stage to move over to the side lacking a nucleus. 68 Spemann then used the 
noose to separate the two sides. He discovered that two identical salaman-
der embryos developed. 69 Spemann's experiment showed that cell division 
in early embryos did not mean a loss of genetic material as Weismann had 
hypothesized. Instead, at the earliest embryonic stages, Spemann found that 
inserting the nucleus of a salamander embryo into an enucleated cell, that 
is, one lacking a nucleus, directed that cell to develop into a salamander 
embryo.70 
Spemann wondered whether his experiment with early embryonic 
salamander cells would work with older embryonic or perhaps even adult 
cells. Although he did not use the term "cloning," Spemann wanted to 
insert the nuclei of older cells into enucleated egg cells, which is nuclear 
transplantation cloning.71 Spemann, however, could not figure out how to 
do so. 
In 1952, Robert Briggs, an embryologist, accomplished what Spemann 
had suggested twelve years earlier. Briggs and Thomas J. King, a Ph.D. 
student at New York University, conducted experiments on older embry-
onic cells taken from frog embryos having between 8000 and 16,000 
cells.72 Briggs and King removed the nucleus from a frog ovum and then 
inserted the nucleus of an older embryonic cell into the enucleated frog 
egg. Briggs and King used 197 frog eggs, and ended up with thirty-five 
frog embryos.73 Of those thirty-five embryos, twenty-seven emerged as 
tadpoles.74 Other scientists repeated the experiments, confirming the results 
ofBriggs and King; however, scientists discovered that the older and more 
differentiated the cell, the less success they had with nuclear transplanta-
tion experiments.75 
In 1962, John Gurdon seemed to overcome the hurdle of differentiation 
by creating frogs from tadpole cells. Gurdon, a developmental biologist, 
inserted the nuclei from the intestines of tadpoles into enucleated frog eggs. 
The eggs with the intestine nuclei developed into adult frogs. 76 Gurdon's 
68 See id. at 60. 
69 See id. 
70 See id. 
71 See id. at 61. 
72 See id. at 62-64. 
73 See id. at 65. 
74 See id. 
75 See id. at 66; CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 17-18. 
76 See KOLATA, supra note 2, at 67; CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 
17. 
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experiment worked only two percent of the time, 77 but it proved significant 
because he had used cells much more differentiated than those used by 
Briggs and King. 
Still, tadpoles are not adult frogs. In 1975, Gurdon tried to clone adult 
frogs, but proved unsuccessful. He inserted the nuclei from adult frog skin 
cells into enucleated frog eggs. In four percent of the nuclear transfers, a 
tadpole resulted, but Gurdon's goal of creating an adult frog from the skin 
cell of an adult frog eluded him.78 
By the 1970s, scientists had cloned embryonic cells and had created 
frogs from differentiated tadpole cells and tadpoles from adult frog skin 
cells. However, no one had created an adult clone from the differentiated 
cells of an adult animal. Moreover, no one had succeeded in creating a 
mammalian clone. 
That seemed to change in 1979 with the announcement by Karl 
Tilmensee, a famous and well-respected scientist from the University of 
Geneva, that he had cloned three mice from early embryonic mouse cells.79 
lllmensee's announcement rocked the scientific community. Although he 
had used embryonic cells, not skin or other highly differentiated cells from 
an adult mouse, Tilmensee was the first to produce a clone of a mammal. 80 
Earlier experiments had used salamanders, frogs, and tadpoles. Tilmensee' s 
results had potentially far-ranging implications for human cloning because 
humans, like mice, are mammals. 
Tilmensee' s experiments came under fire. Members ofTilmensee' sown 
lab began questioning his results, and the University of Geneva appointed 
an international commission to investigate. 81 Although ultimately clearing 
lllmensee of fraud, the commission concluded that ''because of the 
sloppiness ofTilmensee's documentation, the entire series of experiments 
under question [was] 'scientifically worthless.' "82 In addition, no other 
scientist proved capable of repeating lllmensee's cloning experiment. In 
1984, Science published an article83 by Davor Solter, a developmental 
77 See KOLATA, supra note 2, at 67; CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 
17. 
78 See CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 18. 
79 See KOLATA, supra note 2, at 122. 
80 See id. at 122-23. 
81 See id. at 140. 
82 Id. at 142. 
83 James McGrath & Davor Solter, Inability of Mouse Blastomere Nuclei 
Transferred to Enucleated Zygotes to Support Development in Vitro, 226 SCIENCE 
1317 (1984). 
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biologist, who had tried repeatedly, without success, to duplicate 
Dlmensee' s experiment. Salter stated that "• [ c ]loning of mammals, by 
simple nuclear transfer, is biologically impossible.' "84 The international 
commission's critique of Dlmensee's working methods, coupled with 
Salter's and other scientists' results, sounded the death knell for cloning 
research within prestigious academic and scientific communities. 
Cloning continued, but it "became a pursuit of those who worked on 
the edges of science. It was relegated to those who worked with farm 
animals."85 The focus changed. In the prestigious labs and well-known 
universities, scientists had pursued cloning as a way to understand the 
process of human development. Scientists working with farm animals, 
however, pursued cloning in order to create "better'' animals. 
Animal breeders faced a quandary in their attempts to create animals 
with particular traits. The traditional approach is to inbreed animals that 
have been selected for certain traits and then mate those inbred animals, 
which tend to be feeble or runts, with healthy animals from the general 
population, thereby merging genetic selection with hybrid vigor. 
But when the hybrids are mated, the valuable traits from the inbred 
animals tend to be diluted or lost Embryo subdividing offered a solution: 
It could allow breeders to multiply the valuable animals, including 
hybrids, without the gamble of the genetic lottery. They could simply 
subdivide the selected embryos, making multiple copies of a single hybrid 
creature. 86 
Theoretically, embryo splitting seemed like the solution to the genetic 
lottery. In reality, the success rate dropped off sharply depending on the 
size of the embryo. Scientists had good success with dividing embryos in 
half: between sixty percent and eighty percent of these embryos developed 
into lambs when implanted.87 However, when eight-cell embryos were 
divided into eight cells, only five to ten percent of the implanted embryos 
developed into live lambs.88 
Nuclear transplantation cloning offered a solution to the inefficient 
results produced by embryo splitting. In 1984, Steen Willadsen, a Danish 
84 KOLATA, supra note 2, at 146 (quoting McGrath & Solter, supra note 83, at 
1319). 
85 Id. at 121. 
86 Id. at 178. 
87 See id. 
88 See id. 
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scientist, created two cloned lambs using nuclear transplantation. 89 
Experiments on other mammals proved that scientists could successfully 
produce adult sheep, cattle, pigs, and mice by inserting the nuclei from 
early embryonic cells90 into enucleated sheep, cattle, pig, and mice ova.91 
The technology appeared to be a gold mine. Companies such as W.R 
Grace and Company and Alta Genetics expanded into the business of 
nuclear transplantation cloning. 92 Companies realized that they could turn 
a huge profit by selling multiple copies of valuable embryos. For example, 
suppose a valuable cattle embryo costs $500 to purchase.93 If a scientist can 
remove the nucleus from each cell of that sixteen-cell cattle embryo, insert 
each nucleus into an enucleated egg, and implant the resulting sixteen 
embryos, the company selling the sixteen embryos would gain $8000 in 
revenue, rather than $500. 
The pot of gold at the end of the rainbow, however, never materialized. 
First, nuclear transplantation cloning cost more than anticipated.94 Second, 
businesses overestimated market demand for these cloned, genetically 
superior animals.95 
Cloning research, however, did not disappear. Dr. Ian Wilmut 
recognized the value of cloning in his research involving transgenic 
animals. Transgenic animals "carry foreign genetic material placed by 
scientists into their genomes (or the genomes of their ancestors)."96 The 
process is similar to that for molecular cloning and involves the insertion 
of a gene that codes for the production of certain human drugs into the 
animal's genome. As a result, an animal born with the foreign gene will 
produce the human drug in its milk.97 
89 See id. at 183-84. 
90 The success of nuclear transplantation using early embryonic cells varies 
depending on the stage of embryonic development and the species involved. For 
example, scientists have had no success in cloning adult mice using embryonic 
cells after the eight-cell stage. In sheep and cows, however, scientists have created 
adult sheep and cow clones using cells from 120-cell blastocysts. See CLONING 
HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 20. 
91 See Cloning Hearing, supra note 5, at 12 (statement ofDr. Harold E. V arm us, 
Director, National Institutes ofHealth); CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 
19-21. 
92 See KOLATA, supra note 2, at 185-89. 
93 This example is drawn from KOLATA, supra note 2, at 185. 
94 See id. at 188. 
95 See id. 
96 SILVER, supra note 24, at 230. 
97 Scientists at Genzyme Transgenics Corporation in Framingham, Massa-
chusetts, have created transgenic goats that produce antithrombin ill, which 
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In 1991, Wilmut created a breed of sheep that produced alpha-! 
antitrypsin, a drug used to treat a certain type oflung disease, in its milk.98 
Wilmut found, however, that the process of creating transgenic aniinals, 
which required direct injection of the transgene99 into fertilized eggs, was 
laborious and difficult. Wilmut did not set out to create Dolly; instead, 
nuclear transplantation technology offered a solution to the problems with 
existing transgenic technology. 
[T]he current method of directly injecting genes into fertilized eggs is 
inefficient Not all injected eggs will develop into transgenic animals, and 
then not all transgenic animals will express the added gene in the desired 
manner. The production of transgenic livestock is slow and expensive. 
Nuclear transfer would speed up the expansion of a successful transgenic 
line, but, perhaps more importantly, it would allow more efficient 
generation of transgenic animals in the first place. Foreign DNA, such as 
a human gene, could be introduced into cell lines in culture and cells 
expressing the trans gene could be characterized and used as a source of 
donor nuclei for cloning, and all offspring would likely express the human 
gene. This, in fact, was the motivation behind the experiments that led to 
the production ofDolly.100 
controls blood clotting in humans. Scientists at PPL Therapeutics, the finn that 
funded much oflan Wilmut' s work at the Roslin Institute, have created transgenic 
cows, whose milk contains alpha-lactalbumin, a human nutrient supplement. See 
Genetic Engineering: Building to Order, ECONOMIST, Mar. 1, 1997, at 81. 
Transgenically derived proteins should be safer than blood-derived products 
because they will not be subject to the theoretical risk of transmission of 
viruses, including H.I.V. and hepatitis. They should also be less costly than 
biotechnology drugs produced by fermentation because one large mammal 
can produce far more protein in her milk than the vast colonies of cells 
needed for current processes. Biotechnology industry analysts say these 
could substantially increase the market for therapeutic proteins, currently 
about $7.6 billion dollars a year and expected to grow to $18.5 billion 
dollars by 2000. 
Lawrence M. Fisher, Cloned Animals Offer Companies a Faster Path to New 
Drogs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1997, atB.8; see also CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra 
note 3, at 26 (discussing the scientific interest in improving farm livestock through 
transgenic processes). 
98 See KOLATA, supra note 2, at 215. 
99 Trans genes are the foreign genes added to the animal's genome. See SILVER, 
supra note 24, at 230. 
100 CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at26; see also Famed Sheep Cloner 
Scoops Award, AGBIOTECH NEWS & INFO., Mar. 1998 (visited Jan. 9, 1999) 
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2. Why Is Dolly Different? 
Dolly's birth was not the first instance in which scientists had 
successfully produced animal clones through nuclear transplantation. For 
more than sixty years, scientists have wondered whether the process of cell 
differentiation can be reversed. Early embryonic cells-the blasto-
meres-possess the capacity to each develop into fully formed adult 
animals. Once cell differentiation begins, however, cells, such as muscle 
cells, develop specialized capacities, even though the cell nucleus contains 
the full complement of genetic material necessary to create an adult animal 
(or human being). Over the past sixty years, scientists have experimented 
on various animals in order to determine whether differentiated cells could 
be used to produce adult animal clones. They have successfully produced 
clones of sheep, cows, and pigs. 
If scientists have created other mammalian clones, then why is Dolly's 
birth so significant? 
To understand why this is important, we need to consider some of the 
processes that occur during growth and development of the early embryo. 
Fertilization of the mammalian egg by a sperm is rapidly followed by 
successive cell divisions. The first few cells produced appear to be 
identical to each other, but by the time the sheep embryo is implanted in 
the womb it contains many millions of cells and several recognizable 
tissues. As the fetus grows the cells differentiate further so that at the end 
of pregnancy, the animal has hundreds of different cell types, almost all 
with the same original genetic information as the original fertilized egg 
but each with a specialized function. 
Scientists have tended to assume that this gradual specialization (or 
differentiation) was irreversible. Our previous nuclear transfer studies in 
which we produced Iambs derived from cells from sheep embryos showed 
that some of the cells in the early embryo could be "reprogrammed" to 
develop into all the cell types present in the whole animal. Our latest work 
shows that cells at a much later stage of development, including some 
from adult animals can also be reprogrammed in the same way.101 
Thus, Dolly's birth was a scientific breakthrough: her birth confirmed 
scientists' suspicions that the process of cell differentiation could be 
reversed. · 
<http://www.cabi.org/whatsnew/cloneani.htm#21> (discussing the motivation 
behind the Dolly experjments). 
101 Cloning Hearing, supra note 5, at 20 (statement of Dr. Ian Wilmut, 
Embryologist, Roslin Institute, Scotland). 
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Practically speaking, however, how does Dolly's birth differ from the 
birth of identical twins created through artificial twinning or embryo 
splitting? Perhaps the difference lies in the asexual nature of nuclear 
transplantation "reproduction." 
In nuclear transfer experiments, the situation is different .... Here, 
we have genes that come solely from one donor, so both copies of the 
genes are from a single individual. Now, that donor, of course, was at one 
time derived from two parents, but the progeny of the experiment has the 
same genetic constitution as the donor. 
In a sense, this is like having a twin, separated in time. 102 
However, embryo splitting also creates an identical copy of one 
individual, albeit an "individual" not yet fully developed or recognized in 
law as a person. Similarly, embiyo splitting, like nuclear transplantation, 
does not increase genetic diversity, which is a hallmark of sexual reproduc-
tion. While the embryo results from sexual reproduction, the cells which 
split off from the embryo are identical copies of that embryo and are not 
the product of sexual reproduction. The difference is one of timing. After 
all, an adult human is the product of sexual reproduction, just as the 
embryo is. In the case of embryo splitting, the cloning simply occurred 
closer in time to the sexual reproduction. 
An additional conce{Il raised about cloning is that it deprives children 
born as a result of cloning of the "right to an open future." 
In an era not only of genetic determinism but also of potential genetic 
discrimination, children saddled with another person's DNA might face 
psychological and fmancial risks. Cloning is all too likely to violate what 
the University of Arizona philosopher Joel Feinberg has called the child's 
"right to an open future."103 
However, nuclear transplantation cloning using adult cells is not the only 
form of cloning that carries this potential. For example, given advances in 
cryopreservation, 104 couples undergoing in-vitro fertilization 105 could create 
102 Id. at 13 (statement of Dr. Harold E. Varmus, Director, National Institutes 
of Health). 
103 Lori B. Andrews, Human Cloning: Assessing the Ethical and Legal 
Quandaries, CHRON. OFHIGHEREDUC., Feb. 13, 1998, atB4, BS. 
104 Cryopreservation refers to freezing a living being with the hope of thawing 
it in the future to bring it back to life. See SILVER, supra note 24, at 78. 
105 In vitro fertilization is "an assisted reproduction technique in which 
fertilization is accomplished outside the body." CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra 
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several copies of one embryo, implant one embryo, and cryopreserve the 
remaining copies for later implantation, creating the possibility that 
identical twins could be born, separated in time. 106 Therefore, embryo 
splitting and nuclear transplantation cloning of both adult and embryonic 
cells raise the specter of a generation of children born with predetermined 
"genetic" destinies.107 
Lee Silver, a professor at Princeton University, argues that cloning, 
when coupled with genetic engineering, has made possible the genetic 
alteration of human chromosomes.108 Tinkering with human genes has far-
reaching implications for the species, i.e., the ability to create persons with 
enhanced genetic traits. 
There is a fmal consequence of cloning that is more significant and 
powerful than any other use of the technology, one that has the potential 
to change humankind: the genetic engineering of human beings. Without 
cloning, genetic engineering is simply science fiction. But with cloning, 
genetic engineering moves into the realm of reality ... : [M]ultiple cells 
grown from a single embryo could be subjected to genetic engineering . 
. . . [T]hose that appear to be engineered as desired could be recognized 
and picked out. Each single selected cell could be expanded by itself into 
a clone of cells that provides sufficient material for the confirmation of 
genetic integrity. Then, and only then, would one cell from this mass of 
cells be used by means of nuclear transplantation to produce a new 
embryo, which would develop into a new human being, with a special 
genetic gift. 109 
note 3, app. at 2. 
106 In vitro fertilization is an expensive process with a low success rate-
approximately 19% per cycle of egg retrieval and implantation. See Ethical 
Considerations, supra note 25, at 388. Implanting more than one fertilized ova 
increases the chances of a successful pregnancy. In order to implant more than one 
fertilized ova, however, a woman must produce more than one egg per menstrual 
cycle. Thus, many women take hormones in order to stimulate their ovaries to 
produce multiple ova each menstrual cycle. Blastomere separation offers an 
alternative to taking such hormones. Rather than using hormones to stimulate the 
production of multiple eggs per cycle, scientists could fertilize one extracted egg 
and create multiple clones through embryo splitting. See Fackelmann, supra note 
47, at276. 
107 See Andrews, supra note 103, at B5. 
108 See Ethical Shift, supra note 56, at AI. 
109 SILVER, supra note 24, at 129-30; see also Ethical Shift, supra note 56, atA1 
(discussing the genetic engineering implications of cloning). 
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Professor Silver's assertion about the real implications of cloning has 
already proven to be true, at least for animals. In the summer of 1997, 
Drs. Wilmut and Campbell announced the birth of Polly, a genetically 
engineered clone.110 All of Polly's body cells contained a human gene.111 
Scientists at ABS Global, a Wisconsin corporation, have used similar 
technology to create Gene, a genetically altered cloned calf.112 Clon-
ing coupled with genetic engineering no longer is the stuff of science 
fiction. 
Of course, cloning genetically altered animals does not mean that the 
technology can or will be used in humans. However, news from the Human 
GenomeProject113 about the scientific identification of genes114 that control 
specific human traits may increase the public concern about using cloning 
to "play God"m or to alter "God-given" genetic traits.ll6 In addition, 
Richard Seed, the lllinois physicist who announced his intention to open a 
clinic to create human clones, clearly fueled public fears about man 
interfering with God's role in human creation when he asserted that cloning 
gave man the ability to become God. 
"In the first two chapters of the Old Testament, we learned that God 
made man in his own image. He intended the union of man and God. Is 
this union spiritual or in body? I think it is talking about the body. That 
we would become God in body and spirit." 
Cloning is the first step, Seed says. The second step is manipulation 
of the genetic material to reset the human body clock, to end the aging of 
cells. "Indefinite life extension," he calls it. Man becomes God.117 
no See Tim Friend, Human Genes Put in Cloned Sheep, USA TODAY, July 25, 
1997, at AI. 
m See Gina Kolata, On Cloning Humans, "Never" Turns Swiftly Into "Why 
Not," N.Y.TIMES, Dec. 2, 1997, at AI [hereinafter Kolata, Why Not]. 
112 See id. 
113 See Lawton, supra note I2, at 371 ("The Human Genome Project is an 
international research project, whose goal, simply stated, is to identify the location 
of the 50,000 to 100,000 human genes that code for various human genetic traits 
by mapping and sequencing the entire human genome."). 
ll4 See id. at 376 n.31, 377 nn.34-35. 
115 See CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 44-45. 
116 See Kolata, Why Not, supra note III, at AI. 
117 Gene Weingarten, Strange Egg,· A House Call to the Mysterious Doctor 
Seed, the Man Who Wants to Clone Humans, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, I998, at Fl. 
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Seed's brash statements about cloning struck many as the ultimate hubris, 
and his stated intention to open a human cloning clinic terrified most 
listeners. 
Nevertheless, the potential to combine cloning and genetic engineering 
existed prior to Dolly's birth. For more than a decade, scientists have been 
able to clone mammalian embryos using nuclear transfer technology. And 
genetic engineering dates back to the early 1970s.118 In fact, because of 
their totipotency, embryonic cells, not adult cells like Dolly's, produce 
higher success rates in cloning.119 
Although Drs. Wilmut and Campbell clearly broke a scientific barrier 
with Dolly's birth, it is less clear whether Dolly's creation actually raised 
nove/legal and ethical issues. 
Some commentators have suggested that the furor aroused by the new 
possibility for cloning is out of proportion to most of the ethical, legal, 
and moral issues it raises, since these same issues have been raised by 
previous developments and are simply emerging again in a novel and 
striking form. 120 
Dolly's birth, however, struck a chord in the general population. Public 
reaction might be partially due to the fact that enucleated eggs used in 
nuclear transplantation cloning undergo division only after being exposed 
to a signal external to the egg, such as an electrical current.121 Creating life 
from cells stimulated by electricity conjures up images ofFrankenstein. 122 
118 See KOLATA, s~pra note 2, at 108. 
119 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
12° CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 2. 
121 See id. at 21. 
122 At the hearing held on cloning by the Subcommittee on Public Health and 
Safety of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, George J. Annas 
remarked that "[a] number of Senators have commented on Frankenstein and other 
literary examples that have inflamed the public, and I cannot help but say that I 
think they properly influence the public." Cloning Hearing, supra note 5, at 42 
(statement of George Annas, Edward R. Utley Professor of Public Health Law, 
Boston University School of Public Health). Dr. Willard Gay lin, an ethicist at the 
Hastings Center in New York, commented that "'the Frankenstein factor'" 
accounted for the public's reaction to Dr. Richard Seed, the Illinois physicist who 
announced in late 1997 that he intended to open a clinic in order to produce the 
first human clones. See Gina Kolata, Proposal for Human Cloning Draws Dismay 
and Disbelief, N.Y. DMES, Jan. 8, 1998, at A22 [hereinafter Kolata, Human 
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It is more likely, however, that Dolly's birth simply surprised 
scientists, who thought that cloning using adult somatic cells was imposs-
ible. Drs. Wilmut and Campbell accomplished what scientists had dreamed 
of for more than half a century. Many had dismissed as impossible the 
reversal of cell differentiation in adult animal somatic cells. Looked at in 
this light, the publicity generated by Dolly's birth was no surprise. Because 
few people outside the world of science really followed the vagaries of 
cloning research, the birth came as a shock. Thus, Dolly's creation touched 
people on a visceral level, making real those possibilities that once were 
viewed as the province of nightmares and science fiction, "in which cloning 
leads to dire, doomsday consequences."123 
II. CURRENT EFFORTS TO BAN CLONING 
A. The President's Reaction 
The federal government's response to the announcement by Drs. 
Wilmut and Campbell that they had created the first mammalian clone was 
immediate. On February 24, 1997, President Clinton wrote to Dr. Harold 
Shapiro, the Chair of the NBAC, 124 and charged that body with the task of 
examining the implications of Dolly's birth. President Clinton gave the 
NBAC ninety days to explore the legal and ethical issues associated with 
cloning and to formulate recommendations aimed at preventing the abuse 
of cloning technology.125 Concerned by what he perceived as a gap in 
current federal funding bans on embryo research, President Clinton also 
issued a directive to all executive departments and agencies prohibiting the 
use of federal funds to clone human beings. 126 
Cloning ProposalJ. 
123 CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 6 n.3 (referring to such popular 
works as Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, as well as the films The Boys from 
Brazil and Jurassic Park). 
124 President Clinton originally created the National Bioethics Advisory 
Commission (''NBAC") in the fall of 1995 to advise government agencies about 
"bioethical issues arising from research on human biology and behavior," as well 
as "applications, including the clinical applications, of that research." Exec. Order 
No. 12,975 § 4(a)(1), (2), 60 Fed. Reg. 52,063 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 
6601 (1998). 
125 See CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at Letter from the President. 
126 See Memorandum on the Prohibition on Federal Funding for Cloning of 
Human Beings, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 281 (Mar. 4, 1997). 
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On June 9, 1997, Dr. Shapiro presented the NBAC's report, entitled 
Cloning Human Beings, 127 to President Clinton at a press conference in the 
Rose Garden. The NBAC report recommended adoption of federal 
legislation to ban the use of somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning to create 
children, 128 but the Commission cautioned against legislation that would 
permanently preclude-the use of somatic cell nuclear transfer to create 
cloned children. 
As somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning could represent a means of 
human reproduction for some people, limitations on that choice must be 
made only when the societal benefits of prohibition clearly outweigh the 
value of maintaining the private nature of such highly personal decisions. 
Especially in light of some arguably compelling cases for attempting to 
clone a human being using somatic cell nuclear transfer, the ethics of 
policy making must strike a balance between the values society wishes to 
reflect and issues of privacy and the freedom of individual choice. 129 
The NBAC concluded that serious questions about the use of somatic cell 
nuclear transfer to clone a child justified a limited ban on the technology. 130 
The Commission wanted any legislation to include an expiration date. The 
Commission believed that a permanent ban might unnecessarily infringe 
on an individual's right to make decisions about procreation.131 The NBAC 
also cautioned that any legislation should be carefully drafted in order to 
avoid limiting scientific research that does not implicate the issues raised 
by human cloning.132 
On the basis of the NBAC's recommendations, President Clinton sent 
to Congress draft legislation, entitled the Cloning Prohibition Act of 1997 
("CPA"), 133 that bans the use of nuclear transplantation technology to create 
a human being. The legislation covers both the private and public sectors 
through the exercise of Congress's power to regulate interstate 
commerce.134 
127 See CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3. 
128 See id. at 109. 
129 Id. at 107. 
130 See id. at 109. 
131 See id. 
132 See id. 
133 CLONING PROHIBITION ACT OF 1997, H.R. Doc. NO. 105-97 (1997). 
134 See id. § 2(c), at 6; infra Partill.A. 
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The CPA makes it unlawful for "any person or other legal entity, public 
or private, to perform or use somatic cell nuclear transfer with the intent of 
introducing the product of that transfer into a woman's womb or in any 
other way creating a human being."135 The proposed legislation defines 
"somatic cell nuclear transfer'' as ''the transfer of a cell nucleus from a 
somatic cell into an egg· from which the nucleus has been removed,"136 
which is the equivalent of nuclear transplantation cloning. Thus, the CPA 
does not include blastomere separation as a form of prohibited cloning 
activity. In addition, the CPA does not preclude the creation of clones from 
human embryonic or adult cells, so long as the clone is not implanted in a 
woman's uterus. 
It is unclear why the CPA's prohibition contains the clause "or in any 
other way creating a human being."137 The absence of a comma prior to 
"or'' suggests that the prohibition extends to the creation of cloned children 
by implantation in a woman's womb or by other, as yet unspecified 
methods, such as development in a laboratory. What is clear, however, is 
that the CPA allows all forms of human cloning research. 138 It simply 
prohibits researchers from taking the next step and creating a newborn 
human clone. 
The CPA contains an expiration date, as suggested by the report of the 
NBAC. The Act provides that its prohibitions only apply for five years 
following enactment.139 In addition, the NBAC is required to provide to the 
President, within four and a half years of the CPA's enactment, information 
about the scientific, ethical, and social implications of cloning, as well as 
a recommendation about re-enacting prohibitions on cloning.140 
The CPA imposes fines for persons found liable for violating the Act.141 
In addition, it provides for forfeiture of real or personal property used in 
violating the Act. 142 Finally, the Act gives the Attorney General the right 
to seek injunctive relief against any person about to violate the CPA's 
prohibition on nuclear transplantation cloning. 143 Responsibility for 
l3s H.R. Doc. No. 105-97 § 5, at 7. 
136 Id. § 4 (c), at 6-7. 
137 Id. § 5, at 7. 
138 See id. § 6, at 7. 
139 See id. § 8, at 8. 
140 See id. § 9, at 8. 
141 See id. § 7(a), at 7. 
142 See id. § 7(c), at 7-8. 
143 See id. § 7(b), at 7. 
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enforcement rests with the Attorney General's Office, 144 and no private 
cause of action lies for violation of the Act. 145 
B. The Legislative Response 
Within two weeks of the announcement of Dolly's birth, Senator 
Christopher Bond ofMissouri and Representative Vern Ehlers ofMichigan 
introduced the first pieces of anti-cloning legislation in the Senate and 
House, respectively.146 Since Drs. Wilmut and Campbell announced Dolly's 
birth, a total of nine anti-cloning bills have been introduced in Congress.147 
Congress has yet to enact any anti-cloning legislation, in part due to 
fundamental differences about the status of the human embryo. The debate 
over cloning is being framed as a debate about abortion and embryo 
research. As a result, it is unlikely that Congress will act anytime soon to 
prohibit cloning. 
Only three types of cloning raise questions about genetic determinism, 
human individuality, and the proper scope of scientific inquiry: (I) human 
embryo splitting; (2) nuclear transfer involving human embryonic cells; 
and (3) nuclear transfer involving adult human cells. Only one piece of 
legislation arguably addresses all three forms of cloning. 148 An important 
issue concerns why the current legislative efforts draw distinctions among 
these three forms of cloning. In part, the answer lies in poor drafting. 
Setting aside drafting errors, however, a more fundamental divide emerges. 
There appear to be two lines of thought about the scope of federal anti-
cloning legislation. One group of legislators opposes embryo research. 
They believe that embryos deserve respect as human life and that tamper-
ing with human embryos violates fundamental precepts of a good society. 
144 See id. § 7(d), at 8. 
145 See id. § 10, at 8. 
146 SeeS. 368, 105th Cong. (1997); Human Cloning Research Prohibition Act, 
H.R. 922, 105th Cong. (1997); Human Cloning Prohibition Act, H.R. 923, 105th 
Cong. (1997). 
147 See Prohibition on Cloning of Human Beings Act of 1998, S. 1611, 105th 
Cong. (1998); Prohibition on Cloning of Human Beings Act of 1998, S. 1602, 
1 05th Cong. (1998); Human Cloning Prohibition Act, S. 1601, 1 05th Cong. (1998); 
Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 1998, S. 1599, 105th Cong. (1998); Human 
Cloning Prohibition Act, 8.1574, 105th Cong. (1998); S. 368, 105th Cong. (1997); 
Human Cloning Research Prohibition Act, H.R. 3133, 105th Cong. (1998); Human 
Cloning Prohibition Act, H.R. 923, 105th Cong. (1997); Human Cloning Research 
Prohibition Act, H.R. 922, 105th Cong. (1997). 
148 See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text. 
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As a result, they object to any form of human cloning, whether it involves 
pure research or efforts to implant cloned embryos in order to create an 
adult human clone.149 Other members of Congress are concerned with the 
end result of cloning, which is the creation of an adult human clone. As a 
result, implantation of cloned embryos, not creation of those embryos, is 
the focus of their legislative efforts.150 Of course, this debate is also shaped, 
in part, by current federal funding bans on embryo research.151 Thus, 
legislative restrictions may vary depending on whether the proposed bill 
merely bans federal funding for cloning or imposes an outright prohibition 
on cloning by both public and private entities. In order to understand the 
controversy underlying the cloning debate, it is necessary to understand 
what activities the various pieces oflegislation actually prohibit. 
1. Prohibition of Adult Cell Nuclear Transplantation Cloning 
While the NBAC began its work, Senator Christopher Bond of 
Missouri introduced the first piece offederal anti-cloning legislation in the 
U.S. Senate. On February 27, 1997, Senator Bond introduced a bill ("Bond 
Act") that would ban the use of federal funds "for research with respect to 
the cloning of a human individual."152 The Bond Act defines "cloning" as 
''the replication of a human individual by the taking of a cell with genetic 
material and the cultivation of the cell through the egg, embryo, fetal, and 
newborn stages into a new human individual."153 The Bond Act was 
referred to the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources. 154 
At first blush, the definition of cloning provided in the Bond Act 
appears to cover both blastomere separation and nuclear transplantation 
cloning because it includes the use of any cell with genetic material. 
Unfortunately, the use of the term "human individual" raises questions. 
Does the bill only cover the use of cells with genetic material from human 
individuals who have been born, i.e., considered persons under the law? 
The Act's own language supports this conclusion. Section 1(b) defines 
cloning as the duplication of the cell of a human individual and "cultivation 
of the cell through the egg, embryo, fetal, and newborn stages into a new 
human individual. "155 Thus, a human individual emerges only after 
149 See infra notes 219-21 and accompanying text. 
tso See infra notes 187-93 and accompanying text. 
151 See infra note 222 and accompanying text. 
Jsl S. 368, 105th Cong. § 1(a) (1997). 
Js3 Id. § 1(b). . 
1s4 See S. 368. 
Iss Id. § 1(b) (emphasis added). 
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completion ofthe embryonic, fetal, and newborn stages. Ifthis interpreta-
tion is correct, then the Bond Act restricts funding only to the cloning 
technology used to create Dolly: it does not ban the use of federal funds for 
nucleartransplantation cloning of embryos or embryo splitting. In addition, 
it does not preclude the use of federal funds for cloning research, so long 
as the scientists involved do not implant the clone in an effort to create a 
new human individual. Yet, Senator Bond was one of the first members of 
Congress to criticize the NBAC's failure to address embryonic cloning in 
its report to the President. 
The [NBAC] report drew quick fire from Sen. Christopher S. Bond (R-
Mo.), who expressed disappointment that the commission did not call for 
outlawing the cloning ofhuman embryos for research-a practice opposed 
by some who believe that life begins at conception. 
"I had hoped the federal ethics commission would not be afraid to 
make a strong moral statement," Bond said in a news release. "But when 
it came to the tough questions, they punted, and now it will be up to 
Congress and state legislatures to resolve those issues."156 
Given his strong response to the NBAC' s report, it is clear that Senator 
Bond intended to cover embryonic cloning in his proposed legislation, but 
failed to properly define cloning to cover the activities that he intended to 
ban.1s1 
2. Prohibition of Adult Cell and 
Embryonic Nuclear Transplantation Cloning 
Early in March of 1997, Representative Vern Ehlers of Michigan 
introduced the first two anti-cloning bills in the House, one imposing a 
federal funding ban on cloning and one banning cloning entirely. Ehlers's 
Human Cloning Research Prohibition Act158 ("Funding Act") originally 
banned the use of federal funds ''to conduct or support any project of 
research that involves the use of a human somatic cell for the process of 
producing a human clone."159 
156 Rick Weiss, Bioethics Panel Urges Ban on Human Cloning: Medical Risks, 
Ethical Concerns Merit Federal Law with Periodic Reviews, Board Concludes, 
WASH. POST, June 8, 1997, atA19. 
157 See infra Part II.B.4.b. 
158 Human Cloning Research Prohibition Act, H.R. 922, 105th Cong. (1997). 
ts9 Id. § 2. 
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The Funding Act was referred to both the House Commerce and House 
Science Committees. In July of 1997, the Science Committee, on a voice 
vote, approved an amended version of Ehlers's Funding Act ("Amended 
Funding Act").160 The Amended Funding Act refines the federal funding 
prohibition to cover research ''that includes the use of human somatic cell 
nucleartransfertechnologyto produce an embryo."161 Ehlers's Funding Act 
only covered research that produced a human clone: it did not ban the use 
of federal funds for cloning experiments on human embryos. Thus, the 
Funding Act would not have precluded federal funding for researchers who 
use nuclear transplantation on embryos, but do not implant the cloned 
embryos, because a human clone would not result. The Amended Funding 
Act makes it clear that the funding ban extends to nuclear transfer cloning 
experiments involving human embryos. 
The Amended Funding Act also defines "human somatic cell nuclear 
transfer'' as ''transferring the nucleus of a human somatic cell into an 
oocyte from which the nucleus has been removed or rendered inert."162 
Defining "somatic cell" to include the "cell of an embryo, fetus, child, or 
adult"163 clearly signals the intent to prohibit nuclear transplantation 
cloning using either adult or embryonic cells. To allay fears of the 
biotechnology industry, the Amended Funding Act specifically provides 
that the Act shall not restrict scientific research involving ''the use of 
somatic cell nuclear transfer or other cloning technologies to clone 
molecules, DNA, cells other than human embryo cells, ortissues[.]"164 
Representative Ehlers also introduced the Human Cloning Prohibition 
Act ("Cloning Act"), 165 which imposes an outright ban on nuclear 
160 On January 28, 1998, Representative Cliff Steams of Florida and Repre-
sentative Roger Wicker of Mississippi introduced the Human Cloning Research 
Prohibition Act ("Steams/Wicker Act"), legislation almost identical to Ehlers's 
Amended Funding Act. See Human Cloning Research Prohibition Act, H.R. 3133, 
105th Con g. (1998). The main difference is a change in the language describing the 
prohibited activities. The Stearns/Wicker Act prohibits the use of federal funds 
for "research that includes the use of human somatic cell nuclear transfer 
technology to produce an oocyte that is undergoing cell division toward 
development of a fetus." Id. § 2(a). Ehlers's Amended Funding Act contains a 
prohibition on federal funding of somatic nuclear transfer "to produce an embryo." 
H.R. 922 § 2(a). 
161 H.R.REP.N0.105-239, at2 (1997) (stating the amended version ofH.R. 922 
§ 2(a)). 
162 Id. (stating the amended version ofH.R. 922 § 2(a)(1)). 
163 Id. (stating the amended version ofH.R. 922 § 2(a)(2)). 
164 Id. (stating the amended version ofH.R. 922 § (4)(1)). 
165 Human Cloning Prohibition Act, H.R. 923, 1 05th Cong. (1997). 
308 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 87 
transplantation cloning. The Cloning Act deems it unlawful "for any person 
to use a human somatic cell for the process of producing a human clone"166 
and imposes a maximum fine of $5000 for such unlawful conduct.167 
Despite the early flurry oflegislative activity, congressional attention 
to cloning waned as the fall of 1997 approached. Congress's reaction 
seemed to mirror that of the general public. Lori Andrews, a noted legal 
scholar on issues of reproduction, observed that the time from "horrified 
negation" to "very slow but steady acceptance"168 of cloning by the public 
as a "reproductive technology" had been strikingly brief. 169 "'I absolutely 
think the tenor has changed,' Ms. Andrews said. People who said human 
cloning would never be done 'are now saying, "Well, the risks aren't that 
great," she said.' " 170 This short-lived "acceptance" (or perhaps inattention) 
to cloning changed with the appearance of Dr. Seed. 
In December of 1997, Dr. Richard Seed, an Illinois physicist, told the 
audience at a Chicago meeting on the legal and ethical implications of 
cloning that he planned to open a clinic to perform human cloning.'71 
Apparently, members of the audience ignored him, but an interview on 
National Public Radio in early January of 1998172 made Dr. Seed a 
household name and revived the debate on cloning. 
Dr. Seed does not consider cloning to be unethical. In his opinion, 
cloning offers a way for "man to become one with God."173 By cloning 
himself, man can "have almost as much knowledge and almost as much 
166 Id. § 2(a). 
167 See id. § 2(b). 
168 Dr. Sophia Kleegman and Dr. SheiWin Kaufman have developed a theory 
that the public moves through different stages toward acceptance of new 
reproductive technologies. At first, the public reacts with "horrified negation." 
After a period of time, however, the public passes into a stage known as "negation 
without horror." Finally, the public comes to accept the new technology, passing 
from "slow and gradual curiosity, study, evaluation" to "a very slow and steady 
acceptance." See Kolata, Why Not, supra note Ill, at A17 (discussing SOPHIA J. 
KLEEGMAN & SHERWIN A. KAUFMAN, INFERTILITY IN WOMEN: DIAGNOSIS AND 
TREATMENT (1966)). 
169 Id. (quoting Lori Andrews, Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of 
Law). 
170 Id. (quoting Lori Andrews, Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of 
Law). 
171 See Kolata, Human Cloning Proposal, supra note 122, app. at 22. 
172 Human Cloning Efforts (NPRradio broadcast, Jan. 7, 1998) (interview ofDr. 
Richard Seed by Jo Palca, an NPR reporter). 
173 Id. 
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power as God."174 The outrageousness of Dr. Seed's statements thrust him 
into the limelight. Major newspapers and television and radio shows all 
carried stories abouthim.175 Some questioned whether Dr. Seed, a physicist 
with many failed business ep.deavors, no capital of his own, and a 
personality kindly described as "eccentric," could actually clone a human 
being.176 The media certainly created a frenzy with its reporting on Dr. 
Seed. Nonetheless, this coverage had an important effect-it revived the 
public discussion of cloning. And Congress, once again, responded with a 
flurry of legislation. 
On February 3, 1998, Senator Bond introduced another piece of anti-
cloning legislation, entitled the Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 1998,171 
which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. On the same day, 
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott introduced identical legislation, entitled 
the Human Cloning Prohibition Act (''Bond!Lott Act"}, 178 which, on 
February 4, was placed on the Senate's calendar. 
The Bond!Lott Act imposes criminal and civil penalties179 against 
"'any person or entity, public or private, in or affecting interstate com-
merce, [who] use[s] human somatic cell nuclear transfer technology.' " 180 
The Act also defines "human somatic cell nuclear transfer technology'' as 
the transfer of human somatic cell nuclear material into an enucleated 
human egg to produce an embryo;181 thus, embryo splitting is not within the 
174 Id. 
175 See Kolata,Human Cloning Proposal, supra note 122, atA22; Dirk Johnson, 
Eccentric's Hubris Set 0./fGlobalFrenzy over Cloning, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1998, 
at A1; J. Madeleine Nash, Cloning's Kevorkian, TIME, Jan. 19, 1998, at 58; 
Weingarten, supra note 117, at FO 1. 
176 See Johnson, supra note 175; Nash, supra note 175. 
"One of the great subjects for journalistic review," Mr. Caplan said, ''will 
be how this man, with no money, no standing with physicists, no 
organizational skills-an oddball, really-how this man suddenly turns into 
this authority chatting on the nightly news. 
"Seed was legitimated by the very people who should have been 
scrutinizing him." 
Johnson, supra note 175, at A1 (quoting Arthur Caplan, Director of the Center for 
Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania). 
177 Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 1998, S. 1599, 105th Cong. (1998). 
178 Human Cloning Prohibition Act, S. 1601, 105th Cong. (1998). 
179 A person convicted under the Human Cloning Prohibition Act is subject to 
a maximum of 10 years in prison, fines amounting to twice the gross pecuniary 
gain obtained from the illegal cloning activity, or both. See id. § 3(a). 
1so Id. 
181 Id. 
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Act's purview. Finally, theBond/LottAct creates the National Commission 
to Promote a National Dialogue on Bioethics, explains the Commission's 
duties, and provides the qualifications and selection methods for Commis-
sion members.182 Additionally, the Act requires the Commission to report 
annually to Congress. 183 
In an unusual move, the Bond!Lott Act came up for debate on the 
Senate floor without first wending its way through a Senate committee.184 
Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts and Senator Dianne Feinstein of 
California filibustered the Act in order to prevent floor debate.185 Support-
ers of the Bond!Lott Act proved unable to obtain the necessary sixty votes 
to end the filibuster, in part because many senators expressed concern that 
the Act would unnecessarily impede scientific research.186 
The cloning legislation introduced by Senators Feinstein and Kennedy 
represents a very different conception of the balance between scientific 
inquiry and embryonic rights than the view reflected in the Bond!Lott Act. 
In early February of 1998, Senators Feinstein and Kennedy introduced the 
Prohibition on Cloning ofHuman Beings Act of 1998 ("Feinstein!Kennedy 
Act").187 The Feinstein!Kennedy Act is quite similar to the CPA. It imposes 
stiff fmes against any person or legal entity that attempts to implant an 
embryo created by nuclear transplantation cloning.188 Both acts contain the 
182 See id. § 4(a)-(f}. 
183 See id. § 4(g). 
184 See Chris Black, Senate Vote E./ftctively Kills GOP Bill to Ban Human 
Cloning, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 12, 1998, at A3. 
185 See id. 
186 The American Heart Association, the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation, the Amer-
ican Cancer Society, 27 Nobel Prize winners, as well as researchers at the National 
Institutes ofHealth (''Nlll") figured in the opposition to the Bond/LottAct. See id.; 
Vincent Kiernan, Senate Rejects Bill to Ban Human Cloning, CHRON. OF HIGHER 
EDUC., Feb. 20, 1998, at A40; Finlay Lewis, Concerns over Attempts to Ban 
Human Cloning Top Legislative Agenda ofBiotechlndustry, COPLEYNEWS SERV., 
Mar. 5, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Librazy, CurNws File. 
187 Prohibition on Cloning of Human Beings Act of 1998, S. 1602, 105th Cong. 
(1998). On Februazy 3, 1998, Senators Feinstein and Kennedy introduced the 
Prohibition on Cloning of Human Beings Act of 1998, which was referred to the 
Senate's Committee on Labor and Human Resources. See id. A day later, they 
introduced nearly identical legislation, which, on Februazy 5, 1998, was placed on 
the Senate's calendar. See Prohibition on Cloning of Human Beings Act of 1998, 
S. 1611, 105th Cong. (1998). 
188 SeeS. 1611 § 4. Violators are subjectto fmes of one million dollars or three 
times the"' gross pecuniazy gain or loss resulting from the violation,'" whichever 
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same congressional findings, although the Feinstein!K.ennedy Act adds 
findings demonstrating cloning's effect on interstate commerce.189 Unlike 
the CPA, 190 the Feinstein!K.ennedy Act clearly prohibits-only the implanta-
tion of a cloned embryo created through nuclear transplantation technol-
ogy, stating, "' [i]t shall be unlawful for any person or other legal entity, 
public or privat~l) to implant or attempt to implant the product of 
somatic cell nuclear transfer into a woman's uterus .... '"191 The Act also 
prohibits the use of federal funds to create human clones for such 
implantation. 192 
This language permits research on both human embryonic and adult 
cells using nuclear transfer technology, provided scientists do not implant 
the resulting clone. In addition, nothing in the Feinstein!K.ennedy Act 
prevents clinics from engaging in embryo splitting research or creating a 
human clone through embryo splitting. 
TheFeinstein!K.ennedy Act, like the CPA, requires the NBAC to report 
on the scientific, ethical, and social implications of cloning.193 Unlike the 
Bond/Lott Act, the Feinstein!K.ennedy Act does not permanently ban the 
implantation of embryos created through nuclear transfer.194 The 
Feinstein!K.ennedy Act's prohibitions expire within ten years of 
enactment;195 the CPA's prohibitions terminate within five years of 
enactment.196 Finally, unlike any other piece of anti-cloning legislation, 
including the CPA, the Feinstein!K.ennedy Act contains a preemption 
provision, making clear its intent to preempt all state and local laws 
prohibiting or restricting somatic cell nuclear transfer or other forms of 
cloning research. 197 
is greater. Id. The Attorney General may apply for injunctive relief against 
violators. See id. Finally, both real and personal property used in violating the Act 
is subject to forfeiture. See id. 
189 See id. § 2(13). 
190 See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
191 s. 1611 § 4. 
192 See id. 
193 See id. 
194 Compare Human Cloning Prohibition Act, S. 1601, 10Sth Cong. § 3(a) 
(1998), with S. 1611 § 4. 
195 SeeS. 1611 § 4. 
196 See CLONING PROHffiiTION Acr OF 1997, H.R. DOC. NO. 105-97 § 8, at 8 
(1997). 
197 SeeS. 1611 § 4. 
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3. Prohibition ofNuclear Transplantation 
Cloning and Embryo Splitting 
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The Human Cloning Prohibition Act ("Campbell Act"), introduced by 
Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell of Colorado, 198 is the only anti-cloning 
bill that arguably covers embryo splitting, as well as nuclear transfer using 
human embryonic or adult cells. Because the Act is so poorly drafted, 
however, Senator Campbell's legislative intentions are less than clear.199 
The Campbell Act bans the use of federal funds to "knowingly conduct 
or support any project of research the purpose of which is to clone a human 
being or otherwise create a human embryo."200 The Act also imposes civil 
penalties not exceeding $5000 for each violation, and makes violators 
ineligible for any federal research money for a period of five years 
following the violation.201 · 
4. Evaluation of Current Legislative Efforts 
A number of problems plague the current legislative proposals to 
regulate or ban cloning. First, a number of states have either enacted or 
introduced cloning legislation, yet few of the federal bills address the 
preemption question. Second, several bills suffer from sloppy or imprecise 
drafting, resulting in unintended consequences. Finally, even those bills 
that accurately reflect their sponsors' intent do not provide adequate 
philosophical justification for distinguishing among the various forms of 
cloning. 
a. Preemption202 
Only the Feinstein/Kennedy Act contains a preemption provision. The 
Act provides for the preemption of" 'any State or local law that prohibits 
198 Human Cloning Prohibition Act, S. 1574, 1 05th Cong. (1998). 
199 See infra Part II.B.4.b. 
200 S. 1574 §3(b). The bill contains a typographical error so that there are two 
section 3s. The first is entitled "Prohibition on Human Cloning," while the second 
is called "Enforcement." The prohibitions referred to above appear in the fust 
"section 3." 
201 See id. §3(a), (b). The fines and ineligibility provisions referred to above 
appear in the second "section 3." 
202 This Article does not address the state Commerce Clause issues. First, if 
Congress does not regulate or ban cloning, may the states do so, or would state 
regulation violate the dormant Commerce Clause? Second, if Congress does 
regulate, but fails to include express language preempting state regulation, would 
federal law preempt state legislation? 
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or restricts research regarding, or practices constituting, somatic cell 
nuclear transfer, mitochondrial or cytoplasmic therapy, or the cloning of 
molecules, DNA, cells, tissues, organs, plants, animals, or humans.' "203 
This broad preemption language would apply to most of the current state 
anti-cloning laws and proposed legislation. First, the Act preempts state 
laws that restrict nuclear transfer research of any kind. Second, it also 
preempts state laws that ban any form ofhuman cloning, including embryo 
splitting. TheFeinstein/K.ennedy Act clearly indicates that the states should 
not regulate in this area, at least for the ten-year period of the Act.204 
There are important reasons for Congress to address expressly the 
preemption question in any anti-cloning legislation. First, California, 
Rhode Island, and Michigan already have enacted legislation that either 
bans human cloning or imposes a moratorium on cloning activities within 
the state, while Missouri bans the use of state funds for human cloning 
research. 205 In addition, legislators in a number of other states have 
203 Prohibition on Cloning of Human Beings Act, S. 1611, 105th Cong. § 4 
(1998). 
204 See id. 
205 In 1997, California adopted a five-year moratorium on nuclear trans-
plantation cloning. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 24185 (West Supp. 1998). 
The law amends California's Health and Safety Code to provide monetary penalties 
for cloning. See id. § 24187. Cloning is defmed as the transfer of the nucleus of an 
adult differentiated cell into an enucleated human ovum. Penalties range from 
$250,000 for individual offenders to $1 million for corporate offenders, including 
hospitals and clinics. See id. California law also provides that businesses licensed 
pursuant to the provisions of California's Business and Professions Code will have 
their licenses revoked for violating the law's five-year cloning moratorium. See 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE§§ 16004, 16105 {West 1997). 
In 1998, Rhode Island followed California's lead by imposing a five-year 
moratorium on human cloning. Unlike California, however, Rhode Island enacted 
legislation that covers embryo splitting, as well as nuclear transplantation cloning 
ofboth embryonic and adult cells. See R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 23-16.4-1 (1998) ("The 
purpose of this legislation is to place a ban on the creation of a human being 
through division of a blastocyst, zygote, or embryo or somatic cell nuclear transfer 
.... ").The Act's defmition of"somatic cell" as "any cell of a conceptus, embryo, 
fetus, child or adult'' makes clear the legislature's intent to prohibit nuclear 
transplantation cloning using either embryonic or adult human somatic cells. I d. § 
23-16.4-2(B). Penalties range from $250,000 for individual offenders to $1 million 
for corporate offenders. See id. § 23-16.4-3(A), (B). 
Michigan also enacted anti-cloning legislation in 1998. Unlike California and 
Rhode Island, Michigan did not include a sunset clause in its legislation. Instead, 
Michigan has imposed an outright ban on nuclear transplantation cloning, 
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introduced various anti-cloning bills.206 Most of the bills make cloning a 
apparently involving either embryonic or adult human somatic cells. See MICH. 
COMP. LAWS§ 333.16274(5)(c) (1998) (defining a human somatic cell as "a cell 
of a developing or fully developed human being"). Thus, embryo splitting is not 
a prohibited activity under Michigan law. Michigan also bans the use of state funds 
for cloning. See id. § 333.26403. Finally, Michigan provides administrative and 
civil penalties for violation of the law's cloning prohibition by health professionals 
licensed pursuant to the state's Public Health Code. See id. §§ 333.16274(3), 
333.16275. 
While Missouri does not ban human cloning, the state recently enacted 
legislation prohibiting the use of state money to fund human cloning research. See 
Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.217 (1998). Cloning is defmed as "the replication of a human 
person by taking a cell with genetic material and cultivating such cell through the 
egg, embryo, fetal and newborn stages of development into a new human person." 
I d. 
206 See S.B. 511, 1997 Reg. Sess. § 1 (Ala. 1997) (defining cloning as "the act 
of reproducing a being of like genetic constitution from a single somatic cell by 
repeated cell division"); H.B. 1082, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1997); H.B. 5475, 1998 
Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1998) (defining cloning as the implantation of an embryo created 
through nuclear transplantation); S.B. 241, 139th Gen. Ass., 2d Sess. § 1 (Del. 
1998) ( defming cloning as the "creat[ion] [of] or attempt to create a human child 
using somatic cell nuclear transfer"); H.B. 1237, 1997 Reg. Sess. § 1 (Fla. 1997) 
( defming cloning a human being as "creating a new individual by using the 
complete nuclear genetic material of an existing human being to create a second 
genetic duplicate of that human being"); S.B. 1230, 90th Gen. Ass., 1997-98 Reg. 
Sess. § 5 (Ill. 1998) (defming "human cloning" as the "intentional production of 
a newly fertilized human egg cell that is genetically identical to another human 
being, living or dead"); H.B. 2235, 90th Gen. Ass., 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1997); 
H.B. 1829, 90th Gen. Ass., 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1997); H.B. 932, 1998 Reg. 
Sess. § 1 (Md. 1998) (banning state funding for cloning); H.J.R. 11, 1998 Reg. 
Sess. (Md. 1998) (stating the intent of the legislature to prohibit state funding for 
cloning): H.J.R. 28, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Md. 1997); S.B. 2423, 80th Reg. Sess., 1998 
Reg. Sess. § 1 (3) (Minn. 1998) ( defming cloning to include nuclear transplantation 
involving "human cell[s] from whatever source"); H.B. 2730, 80th Reg. Sess., 
1998 Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1998); A.B. 2849, 207th Leg. (N.J. 1997); S.B. 782, 1997 
Sess. (N.C. 1997) ( defming cloning more broadly than the activities prohibited by 
the bill's language); A.B. 329, 208th Leg. § 1 (N.J. 1998)(defming cloning as "the 
replication of a human individual by cultivating a cell with genetic material through 
the egg, embryo, fetal and newborn stages into a new human individual"); S.B. 
1017, 69th Leg. Ass., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Or. 1997) (containing one of the most 
restrictive definitions of cloning, limiting the prohibited activity to creation of a 
live clone by using an adult, differentiated cell); H.B. 3036, 113 Gen. Ass. § 1(A) 
(S.C. 1998) ( defming cloning as "the growing or creation of a human being from 
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criminal offense, typically a felony.2°7 Given the variety of state anti-
cloning bills, Congress needs to make clear what role the states may play, 
if any, in restricting or banning various kinds of cloning technology. 
Second, uniformity is critical in this area of law.208 To begin with, 
poorly drafted legislation on the state level may unnecessarily impede 
legitimate scientific work. More importantly, cloning is unlike other 
problems such as gun control. The first human clone has not yet been 
created. This provides policymakers with a period of time in which to 
investigate the legal, ethical, and social implications of cloning.209 If there 
is a patchwork of state legislation, with some states allowing certain 
technologies and others banning them, there may be a "race to the bottom." 
In other words, a state may lower legal, ethical, and social safeguards 
a single cell or cells of a genetically identical human being through asexual 
reproduction"); S.B. 410, 73d Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (W.Va. 1997). 
Some states have called upon the federal government to regulate cloning 
technology. See S.J.R 58, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1997) ("[W]e urge the Congress 
of the United States to take the appropriate action to prohibit the cloning of human 
beings in this country .... "); S.J.R 14, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997) (stating "[t]he 
Legislature of the State of California memorializes the President and the Congress 
of the United States to act immediately and swiftly to ban, outlaw, and take all 
necessary means to prevent the cloning of human beings .... "). 
207 See, e.g., S.B. 511, 1997 Reg. Sess. § 2 (Ala. 1997) (making cloning of a 
human being a Class B felony); H.B. 5475, 1998 Reg. Sess. § l(c) (Conn. 1998) 
(making cloning of a human being a class D felony); H.B. 1237, 1997 Reg. Sess. 
§ 1 (Fla. 1997) (defining cloning or attempting to clone any human being as a 
felony of the first degree); S.B. 1230, 90th Gen. Ass., 1997-98 Reg. Sess. § 10 (Ill. 
1998); H.B. 1829, 90th Gen. Ass., 1997-98 Reg. Sess. § 10 (Ill. 1997) (deeming 
cloning a human being or using public funds to engage in such activity a Class 4 
felony); S.B. 2423, 80th Reg. Sess., 1998 Reg. Sess. § 1(2) (Minn. 1998) (making 
it a felony to clone a human being); H.B. 996, 1998 Reg. Sess. § 5 (Miss. 1998) 
(making cloning a felony punishable by no more than five years in prison, a 
$50,000 fine, or both); A.B. 329, 208th Leg. (N.J. 1998) (making cloning of a 
human being a first degree crime, punishable by no more than 20 years in prison, 
a $100,000 fme, or both); S.B. 782, 1997 Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1997) (declaring cloning 
to be a Class E felony); H.B. 3036, I 13th Gen. Ass. § l(C) (S.C. 1998) (making 
cloning a felony that carries penalties of no more than five years in prison, a fme 
of$5,000, or both); S.B. 410, 73rdLeg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (W.Va. 1997) (making 
cloning a felony with penalties ranging from one to five years in prison, fines up 
to $10,000, or both). 
208 See discussion infra Part ill.A.2. 
209 The need for such investigation is clearly set forth in the NBAC's recom-
mendations. See CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 107-10. 
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against human cloning in order to attract revenues for the state. Once the 
first human clone has been created, it will prove extraordinarily difficult to 
turn back the clock. 
b. Drafting Errors 
Most of the current legislative proposals to regulate or ban cloning 
suffer, in varying degrees, from either sloppy drafting and/or questionable 
distinctions. The Bond Act, Ehlers's Funding Act, and Ehlers's Cloning 
Act are less than 100 words long, hardly adequate to address a subject as 
complex as cloning.210 In addition, neither Ehlers's Funding Act nor his 
Cloning Act defines the terms "clone" or "somatic cell." • 
A number of the bills are poorly written, leading to unintended 
consequences. Both the Bond Act and the Campbell Act use circular 
definitions of cloning, thereby excluding activities that the sponsors 
apparently desired to include in the bills' prohibitions.211 For example, the 
Campbell Act defines "cloning" as the creation of a human being by using 
somatic cell nuclear transfer to "initiate a pregnancy that could result in the 
birth of a human being. "212 This definition only prohibits cloning that 
results in the live birth of a cloned child; it does not restrict any form of 
cloning research. Yet, the Campbell Act prohibits "research for the purpose 
of cloning a human being or otherwise creating a human embryo. "213 The 
absence of a comma before the "or'' indicates that the drafter intended to 
ban research that otherwise would create a human embryo. It makes little 
sense to define "cloning" to allow all forms of cloning, including embry-
onic cloning, so long as a child is not born as a result, yet ban any research 
that leads to the creation of a human embryo. The two prohibitions conflict 
with one another. In addition, the Campbell Act seems to ban in vitro 
fertilization, which creates a human embryo by combining human sperm 
and egg outside the human body.214 
210 See S. 368, 1 05th Cong. (1997); Human Cloning Research Prohibition Act, 
H.R. 922, 105th Cong. (1997); Human Cloning Prohibition Act, H.R. 923, 105th 
Cong. (1997). 
211 See, e.g., supra Part II.B.1. 
212 Human Cloning Prohibition Act, 8.1574, 105th Cong. § 3(c) (1998) 
(emphasis added). 
213 Id. § 3(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
214 The Campbell Act has at least two other drafting errors. First, the Act's 
defmition of cloning is grammatically incorrect, leading to a nonsensical 
prohibition. 
[T]he terms "clone" and "cloning" mean the practice of creating or 
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The language of Ehlers's Funding Act also is problematic. Ehlers, 
however, recognized some of the semantic shortcomings in his Funding 
Act and offered substitute language in the nature of an amendment to the 
Science Committee. The Amended Funding Act bans federal funding of 
nuclear transplantation cloning using either embryonic or adult human 
cells.215 Ehlers amended the Funding Act to make clear his intention to 
cover embryonic cloning; however, he did not accomplish his purpose 
because the language of the Amended Funding Act does not cover embryo 
splitting, a form of cloning.216 Embryo splitting does not involve the 
transfer of either adult or embryonic cell nuclei into enucleated eggs.217 As 
a result, funding bans on nuclear transfer do not cover embryo splitting. 
The Bond/Lott Act suffers from the same problem. It defines the 
prohibited activity as nuclear transfer, which, by definition, does not apply 
to embryo splitting.218 Yet, both Bond and Ehlers clearly favor bans on 
embryonic research. The Bond/Lott Act contains a finding clearly 
indicating an intent by the drafters to prohibit research on embryos: "[I]t 
is right and proper to prohibit the creation of cloned human embryos that 
wouldnever have the opportunity for implantation and that would therefore 
be created solely for research that would ultimately lead to their destruc-
tion."219 
Bond also told reporters that those who favor embryo research" 'would 
lead us down the slippery slope that would allow the creation of masses of 
human embryos as if they were assembly line products, not human life.' "220 
In commenting on the difference between the Bond/Lott Act and the 
Feinstein/Kennedy Act, Ehlers remarked that Feinstein and Kennedy 
attempting to create a human being by transferring the nucleus from a 
human cell.from whatever source into a human egg cell from which the 
nucleus has. been removed for the purpose of, or to implant, the resulting 
product to initiate a pregnancy that could result in the birth of a human 
being. 
Id. § 3(c) (emphasis added). Eliminating the words inside the commas leaves the 
language, "the purpose of ... the resulting product to initiate a pregnancy," which 
makes no sense. Second, because the Campbell Act contains two section 3s, the 
Act's enforcement section creates penalties for violation of the Act's findings, not 
the Act's prohibited activities. See supra notes 199-200. 
215 See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
216 See supra Part I.A.1.c. 
217 See supra Part I.A. I.e. 
218 See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
219 Human Cloning Prohibition Act, S. 1601, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998). 
220 Lewis, supra note 186 (quoting Senator Christopher Bond). 
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"'want to continue research with embryos and we want to stop it.' "221 
Therefore, the question is why both the Bond/Lott Act and Ehlers's 
Amended Funding Act do not expressly ban embryo splitting. 
One explanation for these legislative oversights is that Bond, Lott, and 
Ehlers considered a ban on embryo splitting unnecessary given the current 
ban on federal funding for non-therapeutic embryo research.222 Since all 
forms of cloning research require experimentation on embryos, a federal 
funding ban on embryo research amounts to a federal funding ban on all 
human cloning research. 
This explanation, however, does not account for the Bond/Lott Act, 
which bans research involving nuclear transplantation cloning, whether 
carried out by public or private entities.223 The federal funding ban on 
embryo research does not extend to persons or entities that do not accept 
federal funds. Therefore, the Bond/Lott Act leaves an important, unin-
tended gap in coverage: research involving embryo splitting and creation 
ofhuman clones through embryo splitting are not banned, provided federal 
funds are not used. 
Moreover, it is clear that Ehlers intended to create a funding prohibi-
tion coextensive with current federal bans on embryo research. During the 
markup of his Amended Funding Act, Ehlers noted that 
the issue of embryo research is a very difficult issue. I decided the best 
way out of this was simply to use the language that has been used before 
by the Congress, that was passed by the Congress and signed into law by 
the President in the annual appropriations bills ofLaborlllliS [Health and 
Human SeiVices].224 
In addition, the Amended Funding Act defines protected scientific research 
as "somatic cell nuclear transfer or other cloning technologies to clone ... 
221 Vincent Kiernan, Debate Over Cloning Touches One of Society's Most 
Sensitive Nerves, CHRON. OFHIGHEREDUC., Feb. 27, 1998, atA16 (quoting Rep. 
Vernon J. Ehlers of Michigan). 
222 In 1994, the National Institutes of Health discontinued funding for non-
therapeutic research on human embryos. See CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 
3, at 88-89. In both 1996 and 1997, Congress also banned federal funding to the 
Departments of Labor, Education, and Health and Human SeiVices for non-
therapeutic experimentation on human embryos. See id. at 89 (citing Pub. L. No. 
104-91 and Pub. L. No. 104-208). 
223 See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text. 
224 H.R. REP. No. 105-239, at 26 (1997) (statement of Rep. Vern Ehlers during 
the markup of the Amended Funding Act in the House Committee on Science). 
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cells other than human embryo cells."225 Using this definition, embryo 
splitting, which is a form of cloning technology used to clone human 
embryonic cells, does not qualify as protected scientific activity. Yet, the 
Amended Funding Act does not ban the use of federal funds for embryo 
splitting. Thus, Ehlers did not want to protect research involving embryo 
splitting, but that is exactly what his definition of cloning accomplishes. 
This is important if Ehlers intends his Cloning Act to ban all forms of 
cloning, including research on embryos. Given Ehlers's views on embryo 
research, the definition of cloning in his Amended Funding Act is 
problematic. The current federal ban on funding for embryo research 
partially fills in the gaps left by the Amended Funding Act's definition of 
cloning. The federal funding ban, however, would not cover a similar 
definitional gap in the Cloning Act because that Act is an outright ban on 
both private and public activity, not a withdrawal of federal funds for 
certain forms of research. 
c. Philosophical Distinctions 
Both the CPA and the Feinstein/Kennedy Act only prohibit the use of 
nuclear transplantation cloning and only if the product of that cloning is 
implanted in a woman's uterus to give birth to the clone.226 This narrow 
prohibition raises two important questions. First, why do the CPA and the 
Feinstein/Kennedy Act ban only nuclear transplantation cloning? Second, 
why does the prohibition in both Acts apply only to the implantation and 
actual creation of a newborn human clone? 
Neither the CPA nor the Feinstein/Kennedy Act bans the creation of 
human clones accomplished through embryo splitting. 227 If a scientist 
transfers the cell nucleus from a human somatic cell into an enucleated 
ovum and implants the resulting clone, he or she would violate the CPA 
and the Feinstein/Kennedy Act. If the same scientist "breaks apart" a four-
celled embryo, cultures each of the four totipotent cells, and implants each, 
four identical c4iJ.dren will be born, but she will not violate the CPA or the 
225 Id. at 2 (citing H.R. 922, 105th Cong. § 4(1) (1997)) (emphasis added). 
226 The CPA and the Feinstein/Kennedy Act ban the implantation of a clone 
created by nuclear transfer technology. The CPA, however, also bans the use of 
nuclear transplantation to "in any other way creat[e] a human being." H.R. Doc. 
No. 105-97, § 5, at 7 (1997). The CPA, then, seems to address the possibi_Iity of 
creating human clones outside the human body, e.g., in the laboratory. 
227 See id.; ProhibitionofCloningofHumanBeingsActof1998, S. 1611, 105th 
Cong. § 4 (1998). 
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Feinstein/K.ennedy Act. Therefore, the two Acts ban human cloning only 
when certain technology is used, that is, nuclear transplantation cloning. 
One explanation for this distinction is that the sponsors of the bills, 
unlike the sponsors of the Bond/Lott Act, may have intended to distinguish 
between embryo splitting andnucleartransplantation cloning. It is less than 
clear, however, why such distinctions would be drawn. The same dan-
gers-negative eugenics, the loss of individuality, and the objectification of 
children-result not only from use of individual somatic cells, whether 
drawn from adult humans or adult embryos, but also from embryo 
splitting.228 The goal of embryo splitting is increasing the efficiency of 
assisted reproductive techniques.229 The couple's interests prevail over any 
potential concern about genetic selection of good embryos or about the 
individuality of offspring that are created through artificial twinning. While 
differences do exist between nuclear transplantation cloning and embryo 
splitting, both raise the specter of negative eugenics and the potential loss 
of what President Clinton, in his message accompanying the CPA, calls our 
"God-given individuality."230 
The second problem with the Feinstein/K.ennedy Act and the CPA is 
the focus on creation of a human clone. The assumption is that the only 
harm involved in cloning is the end result-the birth of a human clone. At 
the moment, cloning is considered unsafe, 231 yet if Congress allows 
research on embryonic and adult cell cloning to continue, scientists may 
overcome these safety concerns. The issue, then, is not safety alone. Should 
society allow cloning if it is medically safe, i.e., no physical harm to the 
clone? Such a narrow definition of harm ignores other important values, 
such as the "right to an open future."232 If scientists perfect cloning 
techniques to eliminate physical harms, it is likely that fertility specialists 
and infertile couples will exert pressure to actually use the technology, 
asserting a right of individual choice. "The American attitude is one of 
'show me the money, and the technology will become available somehow.' 
228 See discussion supra Parts I.A.1.d and I.B.2. 
229 See supra note 106. 
230 On June 9, 1997, President Clinton held a news conference in the Rose 
Garden at the White House to announce his transmittal to Congress of the CPA. 
President Clinton noted that his legislation would "reaffirm our most cherished 
belief about the miracle of human life and the God-given individuality each person 
possesses." Remarks Announcing the Proposed "Cloning Prohibition Act of 1997 ," 
33 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 844, 845 (June 9, 1997). 
231 See CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 108. 
232 See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
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... [W]e need to give serious thought to whether our laissez-faire market 
mechanisms are the best determinants of how children should be brought 
into the world."233 The absence of effective controls on other forms of 
reproductive technology has created this "anything goes" mentality, fed by 
couples desperate to conceive. At a minimum, the lessons learned from the 
excesses of other assisted reproductive technology techniques234 should 
advise caution in crafting underinclusive prohibitions on cloning technol-
ogy. 
III. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS 
A. Congress's Power to Regulate Commerce235 
Congress derives its power to regulate interstate commerce from 
Article I of the Constitution, which empowers Congress to "regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with 
the Indian Tribes."236 The representatives to the Constitutional Convention 
did not debate the ·meaning of the Commerce Clause; hence, no record 
exists of its meaning.237 Nevertheless, there is a long history of Supreme 
Court case law on the Comm~rce Clause that addresses the legitimacy of 
both the power of Congress and the power of the states to enact legislation 
that affects interstate commerce. 
Between the adoption of the Constitution and the Civil War, the 
Supreme Court did not find any federal commercial legislation to be 
constitutionally invalid.238 However, the Court did speak to the issue of 
congressional power to regulate interstate commerce during this time. The 
most famous case is Gibbons v. Ogden,239 decided in 1824. Gibbons 
originated as an action for injunctive reliefby Aaron Ogden, who had been 
233 Andrews, supra note 103, atBS. 
234 See CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 98 ("The history of infertility 
treatment-especially that of in-vitro fertilization-demonstrates that where there is 
a sizeable and well financed demand for a novel service, there will be professionals 
willing to provide it."). 
235 For a general history of the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence, see JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§§ 
4.1-4.9, at 131-64 (5th ed. 1995). 
236 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
237 SeeNOWAK&ROTUNDA,supranote235, § 4.3, at 137. 
238 See id. § 4.4, at 139-40. 
239 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
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assigned an exclusive right pursuant to New York state law to operate 
steamboats on New York waterways.240 Ogden sought an injunction to 
enforce this right against Thomas Gibbons, who operated two steamboats 
between New Jersey and New York pursuant to an act of Congress.241 
In an opinion authored by Chief Justice John Marshall, the Supreme 
Court held that the New York law was unconstitutional because it violated 
the Supremacy Clause. In the course of his opinion, however, Marshall 
established general principles that, to this day, govern in Commerce Clause 
adjudication. First, Marshall gave an expansive, rather than a restrictive, 
definition of commerce. 
The counsel for [Ogden] would limit [commerce] to traffic, to buying and 
selling, or the interchange of commodities, and do not admit that. it 
comprehends navigation. This would restrict a general term, applicable to 
many objects, to one of its significations. Commerce, undoubtedly, is 
traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It describes the 
commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its 
branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that 
intercourse. 242 
Defining commerce, however, was not the end of the inquiry for Marshall. 
The Commerce Clause provides that Congress may regulate commerce 
"among the several States."243 For Marshall, the question was how far 
Congress could regulate. In other words, did Congress's power to regulate 
interstate commerce stop at a state's boundaries? Marshall answered this 
question in the negative: if a commercial transaction begins in interstate 
commerce, simply because it ultimately rests within a state's internal 
boundaries does not except such commerce from Congress's power.244 
Marshall did, however, recognize that Congress's power to regulate 
commerce did not extend to "the exclusively internal commerce of a 
State. "245 Finally, Marshall stated that the only limitations on congressional 
240 See id. at 2. 
241 See id. (noting that Gibbons responded by asserting that his boats ''were duly 
enrolled and licensed, to be employed in carrying on the coasting trade, under the 
act .of Congress, passed the 18th of February, 1793, c. 8, entitled 'An act for 
enrolling and licensing ships and vessels to be employed in the coasting trade and 
fisheries, and for regulating the same'"). 
242 Id. at 189-90. 
243 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
244 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194-96. 
245 Id. at 195. 
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power to regulate interstate commerce were those provided in the text of 
the Constitution itself.246 
Marshall's expansive vision of Congress's Commerce Clause powers 
governs today, but that has not always been the case.247 During the first 100 
years of the nation's history, Congress enacted few commercial laws; 
hence, there was little Commerce Clause case law by the Supreme Court.248 
In the period between 1888 and 1933, the Tenth Amendment,249 which 
reserves to the states those powers not specifically delegated to the federal 
government, drove the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause case law.250 As 
a result, the Court struck down legislation that interfered with the reserved 
powers of the states, unless Congress demonstrated a "direct" connection 
to interstate commerce.251 
The Supreme Court and the executive branch collided during the 1930s 
because the Court invalidated a number of pieces of New Deal 
legislation.252 In early 1937, the Court's willingness to find federal 
legislation unconstitutional changed with President Roosevelt's proposal 
to "pack" the Court.253 Although Congress rejected his plan, it had the 
desired effect: the Court restrained its inclination to declare acts of 
Congress unconstitutional. 254 
Today, the Supreme Court accords great deference to congressional 
statutes enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Over the past sixty 
years, the Court rarely has invalidated a piece of federal legislation on the 
grounds that Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause. 
Thus, prior to the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. 
Lopez,255 most lawyers and constitutional scholars realized that most 
federal legislation, if challenged as violative of the Commerce Clause, 
would survive constitutional scrutiny. However, commentators struggled 
to articulate a coherent rationale underlying the Supreme Court's Com-
246 See id. at 196. 
247 SeeNOWAK&ROTUNDA, supra note 235, § 4.4, at 141. 
248 See id. § 4.4, at 139. 
249 U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people."). 
250 SeeNOWAK&ROTUNDA,supra note235, § 4.4, at 145. 
251 See id. 
252 See id. § 4.7, at 151-55. 
253 See id. § 4.7, at 154-55. 
254 See id. § 4.7, at 155. 
255 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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merce Clause case law.256 The Supreme Court's failure to articulate clear 
limitations on congressional authority under the Commerce Clause has 
created much confusion, which the Court's decision in Lopez has done little 
to eliminate. 
Lopez has generated a flurry of scholarly debate.257 It is unclear how 
Lopez will shape the future of federal Commerce Clause litigation, but an 
analysis of the opinion suggests that Lopez does not herald a radical shift 
in the deference the Court has accorded to federal legislation enacted 
pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 
1. United States v. Lopez258 
Lopez involved a challenge to section 922(q) of the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act of 1990,259 which criminalized the possession of"a firearm at a 
place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a 
school zone."260 In March of 1992, Lopez, a twelfth grade student, was 
arrested and charged with violating section 922(q).261 Lopez sought 
256 See Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power 
and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 554 (1995) 
(arguing that "our post-1937 [Commerce Clause] theory, whether before or after 
Lopez, is a mess"); see also John Frantz, Recent Developments, The Reemergence 
of the Commerce Clause as a Limit on Federal Power: United States v. Lopez, 115 
S. Ct. 1624 (1995), 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 161, 161 {1995) (footnote 
omitted) (noting that the Court "has never articulated a clear standard isolating 
those intrastate activities that are valid subjects of congressional control"). 
257 See generally Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce 
Clause: Life After Lopez, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 801 (1996) (examining the 
effect of Lopez on federal criminal law and on the congressional effort to federalize 
crime); Lino A. Graglia, United States v. Lopez: Judicial Review Under the 
Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 719 (1996) (suggesting that the Court should 
' withdraw from review of congressional legislative authority); Regan, supra note 
256 (suggesting that the Court should evaluate congressional commerce power 
based upon the need for federal action and the inability of the states to address the 
problem); Robert Wax, Comment, United States v. Lopez: The Continued 
Ambiguity of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 69 TEMPLE L. REv. 275 (1996) 
(arguing that the Court both misused precedent and distorted various tests inLopez, 
resulting in an ambiguous and inefficient interpretation of the Commerce Clause). 
258 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
259 Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994). 
260 Id. § 922(q)(2)(A). 
261 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at551. 
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dismissal of the charges on the grounds that Congress lacked the authority 
to legislate with regard to local public schools. 262 The federal district court 
denied the motion and, at the conclusion of a bench trial, sentenced Lopez 
to six months in prison.263 Lopez appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit reversed his conviction.264 The Fifth Circuit found section 
922( q) to be an invalid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clausepowers.265 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and in a five-to-four decision, the 
Court upheld the Fifth Circuit's decision. 
Justice Rehnquist began the majority opinion with a brief history of the 
Supreme Court's decisions on the federal Commerce Clause.266 From those 
decisions he gleaned three categories of activities that the Court has found 
are permissible areas for federal regulation. 
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate 
commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate 
commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate 
activities. Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes the power to 
regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate 
commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate 
commerce.267 
After quickly rejecting the first two possibilities as applicable to 
section 922( q), Rehnquist proceeded to analyze the third source of 
congressional commerce authority-substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.268 Rehnquist concluded that the activity proscribed by section 
922( q) did not substantially affect interstate commerce based upon three 
separate arguments.269 
First, he concluded that the possession of a handgun constitutes 
criminal, not commercial activity. "Section 922( q) is a criminal statute that 
by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic 
262 See id. at 552. 
263 See id. 
264 See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995). 
265 See id. at 1367-68. 
266 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552-59. 
267 Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted). 
268 See id. at 559. 
269 See id. at 560-63. 
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enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms."270 Second, lie 
found that the statute did not require proof that the possession of the 
firearm had "an explicit connection with or effect on interstate 
commerce."271 Finally, Rehnquist admitted that Congress normally does not 
need to make findings as to the burdens a proscribed activity has on 
interstate commerce. 272 However, he noted that where the impact of an 
activity on interstate commerce is not "visible to the naked eye,"273 the 
absence of such fmdings makes it more difficult for the Court to make the 
connection to interstate commerce. 
Justices Thomas and Kennedy wrote concurring opinions,274 but it is 
Justice Kennedy's opinion that suggests that Lopez is not a radical 
departure from prior Supreme Court Commerce Clause jurisprudence. As 
did Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy identified the proscribed behavior 
in Lopez as noncommercial and without an "evident commercial nexus.•ms 
In addition, he found that section 922( q) intruded into an area traditionally 
considered to be within the realm of state control-education. 276 However, 
Justice Kennedy cautioned against a return to an earlier conception of 
commerce that worked in the eighteenth century, but which would fail if 
used in today's national, unified market. 
[T]he Court as an institution and the legal system as a whole have an 
immense stake in the stability of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence as 
270 Id. at 561 (footnote omitted). One commentator has criticized Rehnquist's 
reading of the Commerce Clause for requiring the prohibited activity to be 
commercial in nature. 
But even if the leading cases involve commercial behavior, they do not 
rely on Justice Rehnquist's commercial-noncommercial distinction .... The 
focus is on effects on commerce, not on the commercial nature of the 
behavior regulated. So Justice Rehnquist's suggestion, while not 
inconsistent with the existing cases, is a highly tendentious gloss on them. 
Regan, supra note 256, at 564 (footnote omitted). 
271 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562. Rehnquist relied upon United States v. Bass, 404 
U.S. 336 (1971), in which the Supreme Court overturned a conviction for firearm 
possession because the federal government had failed" 'to show the requisite nexus 
with interstate commerce.'" Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562 (quoting Bass, 404 U.S. at 
347). 
272 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562. 
213 Id. at 563. 
214 See id. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
215 Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
216 See id. at 580-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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it has evolved to this point Stare decisis operates with great force in 
counseling us not to call in question the essential principles now in place 
respecting the congressional power to regulate transactions of a commer-
cial nature. That fundamental restraint on our power forecloses us from 
reverting to an understanding of commerce that would serve only an 18th-
century economy ... ; it also mandates against returning to the time when 
congressional authority to regulate undoubted commercial activities was 
limited by a judicial determination that those matters had an insufficient 
connection to an interstate system. Congress can regulate in the commer-
cial sphere on the assumption that we have a single market and a unified 
purpose to build a stable national economy.277 
327 
This hesitation to revisit Commerce Clause history, when coupled with the 
four dissenting votes cast in Lopez, 278 makes it unlikely that the decision 
heralds a new era in Commerce Clause litigation. 
2. Will Federal Cloning Legislation 
Survive Scrutiny under Lopez? 
Despite the confusion surrounding Lopez, the decision appears to 
impose no impediment to passage of the CPA, the Feinstein!Kennedy Act, 
or the Bond/Lott Act. First, human cloning research is not a purely 
intrastate activity.279 The difficulty that the Supreme Court encountered in 
Lopez was in concluding that an intrastate activity-possession of a 
firearm-substantially affected interstate commerce. The Supreme Court 
developed the "affecting commerce" test ''to define the extent of 
Congress's power over purely intrastate commercial activities that 
nonetheless have substantial interstate effects."280 As a result of Lopez, 
Congress may regulate the movement of persons or goods across state lines 
without demonstrating a substantial impact on interstate commerce.281 
Thus, the "affecting commerce" test only comes into play when Congress 
277 Id. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
278 Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer each wrote separate dissenting opinions. 
See id. at 602 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 603 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 615 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). In addition, Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined 
in Justice Breyer's dissent. See id. at 615 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
279 See infra notes 290-98 and accompanying text. 
280 United States v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669,671 (1995) (per curiam) (citation 
omitted). 
281 See Regan, supra note 256, at 560 (footnote omitted) ("Congress may 
prohibit the movement across state lines of anything it pleases."). 
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regulates intrastate, noncommercial activity with a questionable commer-
cial impact. 
But cloning is clearly a commercial activity. Treating infertility is big 
business. Each cycle of in vitro fertilization ("IVF") can cost between 
$5000 to $10,000.282 Because IVF is inefficient,283 it may cost a couple 
anywhere from $40,000 to $200,000 to have a child using IVF 
technology.284 Other costs, such as the rapidly increasing price of donor 
eggs, 285 may add to the basic fees for IVF. 
Cloning may increase the efficiency of IVF. At present, a woman 
undergoing IVF must take hormones in order to stimulate her ovaries to 
produce multiple eggs per menstrual cycle. Cloning eliminates the need for 
ovarian stimulation. One egg can be fertilized outside the body and divided 
in half through embryo splitting, resulting in identical embryos for 
implantation.286 Alternatively, the nuclei from the cells of one embryo may 
be inserted into donor eggs, resulting in multiple clones of one fertilized 
ovum. These services, which potentially increase the efficiency ofiVF and 
decrease the risks involved for the woman, could create a whole new 
market for fertility experts to exploit. 
Moreover, the experiments that led to Dolly's birth clearly reveal the 
commercial implications and nature of cloning. PPL Therapeutics ("PPL"), 
a pharmaceutical company working to find more efficient methods to 
produce human drugs, helped finance the cloning research of Dr. Wilmot 
and Dr. Campbell. 287 After the announcement ofDolly's birth, the price of 
PPL' s stock increased by sixty-seven percent. 288 PPL also has filed for a 
patent on the cloning technology that resulted in Dolly's birth.289 
282 See Anne M. Lawton & Lynda J. Oswald, Teaching the Doctrine of 
Precedent Through Simulations, 13 J.LEGALSTUDIESEDUC. 121, 132 n.15 (1995). 
283 The success rate, measured by the number of live births for each cycle of egg 
retrieval and implantation, is approximately 19%. See Ethical Considerations, 
supra note 25, at 388. 
284 See SILVER, supra note 24, at 69. 
285 As women age, the probability of becoming pregnant decreases. Thus, some 
women may choose to use eggs donated by younger women in order to become 
pregnant. See Lisa Belkin, Pregnant with Complications, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 
26, 1997, at 35. The price of donor eggs for in vitro fertilization recently made the 
news when a New Jersey fertility clinic offered to pay $5000 for a month's supply 
of eggs. See Gina Kolata, Price of Donor Eggs Soars, Setting Off a Debate on 
Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1998, at AI. 
286 See supra note 106. 
287 See KOLATA, supra note 2, at 213. 
288 See Dolly Makes PPL 's Shares Soar, AGBIOTECHNEWS & INFO., May 1997 
(visited Oct. 28, 1998) <http://www.cabi.org/whatsnew/cloneani.htm#IO>. 
289 See KaLATA, supra note 2, at 220. 
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Furthermore, cloning research and the facilities that conduct such 
research do not involve small, intrastate activities. First, research facilities 
that conduct cloning need scientists. It is unlikely that such facilities would 
advertise solely within the state in which the facility is located, especially 
given the scientific training and knowledge required.290 Research also 
progresses through the sharing of information. Scientists at one facility 
may communicate with those at facilities in other states, sharing informa-
tion or even working on collaborative research projects. Second, research 
institutions cost substantial amounts of money to operate. Without federal 
funds, these facilities will look to the private sector. It is unlikely that the 
funding for such facilities will be limited to intrastate sources, and the 
money certainly will be available. The federal government stopped funding 
IVF research more than twenty years ago, yet clinics performing IVF have 
thrived.291 
Finally, existing reproductive facilities draw patients from outside the 
states in which they operate. The Feinstein/K.ennedy Act recognizes the 
interstate character of reproductive services such as cloning. The Act's 
findings292 provide that ''patients travel regularly across State lines in order 
to access reproductive services facilities."293 The travel involved in 
obtaining assisted reproductive services means that not only the patients, 
but also the "products of biomedical research"294 will move in interstate 
commerce. This is exactly what happened in York v. Jones .295 In that case, 
theY orks, who were residents ofNew Jersey, underwent in vitro fertiliza-
tion at a clinic in Virginia.296 When the Yorks moved to California, they 
290 See SILVER, supra note 24, at 69-70. 
291 See Andrews, supra note 103, at B4. 
292 Congress ordinarily need not make !mdings about the effect of a regulated 
activity on interstate commerce. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 
(1964) (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938)). 
This is especially true in a case involving direct movement of persons and goods 
across state lines, as opposed to a case involving intrastate activity having a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 563 (1995) (''But to the extent that congressional findings would enable us to 
evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected 
interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the 
naked eye, they are lacking here."). 
293 Prohibition on Cloning of Human Beings Act of 1998, S.1611, 1 05th Cong. 
§ 2(13)(C) (1998). 
294 Id. § 2(13)(B). 
295 York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
296 See id. at 423. 
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sued the Virginia clinic, seeking release of one remaining cryopreserved 
embryo.297 Although York did not involve cloning, it demonstrates the 
interstate nature of such "reproductive services."298 
Even if the courts conclude that cloning is an intrastate activity, it 
differs substantially from the activity that Congress attempted to regulate 
in Lopez. The Bond/Lott Act provides for criminal penalties, as did section 
922(q) of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, and the CPA and 
Feinstein!Kennedy Act provide stiff monetary penalties for violations.299 
However, none of the federal cloning bills penalizes an activity that can be 
described as noncommercial in nature. Section 922( q) penalized the mere 
possession of a firearm.300 The federal anti-cloning bills make unlawful an 
activity with significant commercial ramifications. Embryonic cloning 
already has a ready market-infertile couples who would use such cloning 
in order to increase their chances of bearing a child with their genetic 
imprint.301 
More importantly, the reasons expressed in Justice Kennedy's 
concurrence in Lopez simply do not apply with equal force to prohibitions 
on cloning. To begin with, it is not clear that the regulation of medical and 
scientific research is a subject traditionally reserved to the states, as is 
education. Moreover, given the overlap between state and federal 
regulation, how clearly can traditional areas of state concern be delineated? 
The Court made another attempt, not twenty years ago, to exploit the 
concept of areas of traditional state concern, and it gave up the attempt 
only nine years later because of the indeterminateness of that concept. ... 
[E]ven if we accept for purposes of argument that there are recognizable 
areas of traditional state concern, in which the Court should be specially 
solicitous to protect a proper balance of federal and state power, that tells 
us nothing about how to identify the proper balance, or to know when it 
is destroyed. Justice Kennedy gives us little indication of how to answer 
what is, on his formulation, the central question.302 
291 See id. at 422. 
298 1t is not clear that cloning is a form of reproduction, as opposed to repli-
cation. But the analogy to assisted reproductive technologies is appropriate, 
considering the fact that embryo cloning has been proposed as an efficient way to 
solve certain problems associated with in vitro fertilization. See Fackelmann, supra 
note47, at276. 
299 See supra notes 141-42, 179, 188 and accompanying text. 
300 See supra note 260 and accompanying text. 
301 See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text. 
302 Regan, supra note 256, at 566 (footnotes omitted). 
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Even if regulation of medical and scientific discovery falls within the 
traditional purview of state regulatory power, however, the Court would 
only reach that issue if it determined that cloning was not a commercial 
activity. Justice Kennedy objected to the reach of section 922( q) because 
it not only involved what he concluded was a noncommercial activity, but 
also intruded into an area traditionally reserved to the states. 303 
Justice Kennedy also believed it was important to allow the states to 
experiment with solutions to the problem of guns in the schools. He argued 
that if"considerable disagreement exists about how to best accomplish [a] 
goal ... the theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States 
may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various 
solutions."304 Violence in the schools, however, is a far different problem 
than cloning. The complexity of the scientific, legal, and ethical issues 
involved in cloning suggests that a federal response might be appropriate. 
President Clinton already has directed the NBAC to study the issue. 305 
Thus, a qualified panel of experts exists to examine the problems involved 
and to make coherent recommendations on how to approach the legal and 
ethical issues. 
In addition, the costs of nonuniform regulation must be weighed 
against the benefits of allowing states to experiment with what forms of 
cloning they wish to permit. After all, attempting to regulate after the first 
human clone is created is akin to plosing the barn door after letting the 
horse out. If Congress cannot ban cloning, then the task of regulation falls 
to the states. The problem, however, is that not all states will ban cloning. 
Some may ban only certain forms of cloning.306 This means that as 
scientific discovery progresses, enterprising individuals will establish 
cloning facilities in those states with the most favorable legislation, and 
forum shopping may result. Allowing each state to define what forms of 
cloning it will permit means an increased risk that scientists and private 
companies will seek out states with less restrictive laws in order to continue 
unregulated scientific experimentation on cloning. The overriding purpose 
of federal cloning legislation is to stop research into cloning until there is 
a better understanding of the dangers associated with the technology.307 The 
303 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580-81 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
304 I d. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
305 See supra Part II.A. 
306 See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text 
307 See Prohibition on Cloning of Human Beings Act of 1998, S.1611, 105th 
Cong. § 2 (1998). 
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proposed federal legislation is meant to stop a problem before it starts, not 
curtail an existing problem such as students bringing handguns to school. 
Therefore, state experimentation in the area of cloning is not an acceptable 
strategy. 
IV. CLONING AND REPRODUCTIVE LIBERTY 
In a long line of cases dating back to the 1923 case of Meyer v. 
Nebraska,308 the Supreme Court has used a fundamental rights analysis to 
constitutionally protect certain personal decisions related to procreation, 
pregnancy, child-rearing, and marital relationships. The Court's fundamen-
tal rights jurisprudence holds that although such rights are not expressly 
recognized in the Constitution's text, they are subsumed within the notion 
ofliberty in the Due Process Clause. 
Although"[ t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of 
privacy," the Court has recognized that one aspect of the "liberty" 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is "a 
right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of 
privacy." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) .... While the outer 
limits of this aspect of privacy have not been marked by the Court, it is 
clear that among the decisions that an individual may make without 
unjustified government interference are personal decisions "relating to 
marriage, Lovingv. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); procreation, Skinner 
v. Oklahoma ex rei. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535,541-542 (1942); contra-
ception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S., at 453-454; id., at 460, 463-465 
(WHITE, J., concurring in result); family relationships, Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); and child rearing and education, 
Piercev. SocietyofSisters, 268 U.S. 510,535 (1925);Meyerv. Nebraska, 
[262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)]." Roe v. Wade, supra, at 152-153. 
The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very 
heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected choices . . . . This is 
understandable, for in a field that by defmition concerns the most intimate 
of human activities and relationships, decisions whether to accomplish or 
to prevent conception are among the most private and sensitive.309 
308 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
309 Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (citation 
omitted); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-51 (1992) 
(reaffirming Roe's protection of a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy). 
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Once the Court labels a right as fundamental, the strict scrutiny test is 
invoked to evaluate the challenged government action.310 The difficulty in 
administering the fundamental rights analysis lies in determining exactly 
what constitutes a fundamental right. The Court has recognized as 
fundamental those rights ''that are 'implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were 
sacrificed. "'311 The Court also has used a historical test, ranking as 
fundamental those rights that are" 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history 
and tradition.' "312 
The Court appears to apply both tests in making the fundamental rights 
analysis.313 The historical test provides some constraints on judicial 
decision making; however, it leaves little room for constitutional growth 
and potentially cements the Constitution in time. The ordered liberty test 
makes the Constitution a "living document," but it opens up the Court to 
charges that it merely is substituting its notions of a "good society" for 
those of the legislature.314 
310 In Casey, however, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter devised the 
undue burden standard to measure the constitutionality of several abortion 
restrictions in thePennsylvaniaAbortion Contro1Actof1982. See Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 874. Only those three Justices signed onto this portion of the Court's opinion, 
so the strict scrutiny test still applies to cases involving fundamental rights. "[T]he 
''undue burden" standard . . . is created largely out of whole cloth by [Justices 
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter]. It is a standard which even today does not 
command the support of a majority of this Court." Id. at 964 (R.ehnquist, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
311 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986) (quoting Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325-26 (1937)). 
312 Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) 
(opinion of Powell, J.)). 
313 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct 2258 (1997). 
314 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 513 n.5 (1965) (Black, J., 
dissenting). 
"(J]udges are seldom content merely to annul the particular solution before 
them; they do not, indeed they may not, say that taking all things into 
consideration, the legislators' solution is too strong for the judicial stomach. 
On the contrary they wrap up their veto in a protective veil of adjectives 
such as 'arbitrary,' 'artificial,' 'normal,' 'reasonable,' 'inherent,' 
'fundamental,' or' essential,' whose office usually, though quite innocently, 
is to disguise what they are doing and impute to it a derivation far more 
impressive than their personal preferences, which are all that in fact lie 
behind the decision." 
ld. (citations omitted) (quoting LEARNED HAND, THEBILLOFRIGHTS 70 (1958)). 
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What is clear is that neither test offers a useful standard for measuring 
those rights deemed by the Court to be fundamental. "The basis upon 
which the Court declares an aspect of liberty to be a fundamental constitu-
tional right remains vague today."315 This makes predictions about the 
Court's analysis of anti-cloning legislation difficult. Nonetheless, based on 
recent decisions by the Court involving questions of individual liberty, it 
appears unlikely that the Court will recognize the right to clone as 
fundamental. 
First, the Court likely will :frame the issue narrowly, as it did in Bowers 
v. Hardwicl2 16 and Washington v. Glucksberg.311 Framing the question as 
the right to use cloning, as opposed to the right to control procreative 
choices, guarantees that cloning will fail the historical test for fundamental 
rights. Second, although the Supreme Court reaffirmed the central holding 
of Roe v. Wade3 18 in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,319 it did so in a fractious 
and fractured decision. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, in their 
joint opinion, intimated that they would have ruled differently in Roe.320 
Cloning raises many ethical issues related to the abortion debate. Given the 
Court's discomfort with Roe, it is highly unlikely that it will overturn anti-
cloning legislation that was adopted, in part, to protect against embryonic 
research. 
A. The Right to Clone or the Right to Control Procreation? 
1. Framing the Issue: 
The Debate over Substantive Due Process 
If Congress enacts anti-cloning legislation, any challenge to that 
legislation will play out against the backdrop of the Supreme Court's 
continuing debate over the legitimacy of substantive due process.321 In the 
315 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 235, § 11.7, at 404. 
316 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (framing the issue not in 
tenns of the fundamental right of privacy, but rather as "whether the Federal 
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy"). 
317 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2269 (1997) (framing the issue 
not in tenns of the fundamental right of privacy, but rather as ''whether the 'liberty' 
specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right to commit suicide"). 
318 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
319 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
320 See infra notes 409-10 and accompanying text. 
321 Substantive due process generally requires that legislation be "fair and 
reasonable in content as well as application." BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY 1429 (6th 
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early part of this century, substantive due process acquired a black eye. The 
Court used the doctrine to protect the free market from unnecessary 
government intrusions.322 The Court's "review of legislation during this 
period resulted in an unprincipled control of social and economic 
legislation."323 As the Court continued to apply substantive due process to 
strike down much of the New Deal economic legislation, President 
Roosevelt responded with his infamous Court-packing plan.324 Congress 
ultimatelyrejectedRoosevelt's plan, but not before it had the desired effect 
of dissuading the Court from using substantive due process to review and 
reject New Deal economic legislation.325 In 1937, in West Coast Hotel Co. 
v. Parrish,326 the Court retreated from its commitment to substantive due 
process review of economic legislation, signaling the end of an era. 327 
However, substantive due process reemerged in the early 1960s as the 
Supreme Court began to review state legislation infringing on what the · 
Court called :fundamental rights and liberties. In Griswoldv. Connecticut, 328 
the Court held that a Connecticut statute that penalized both the use of 
contraceptives and the dissemination of information or advice about 
contraceptive use was unconstitutional.329 Justice Douglas, speaking for the 
majority, stated that he was not using substantive due process to review the 
constitutionality of the Connecticut law.330 Nonetheless, his analysis 
arguably amounted to a substantive review of the fairness of the Connecti-
cut law, albeit disguised as a case involving the penumbras of the First 
Amendment.331 Douglas favorably cited Meyer v. Nebraska332 and Pierce 
ed. 1990). 
322 See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 235, § 11.4, at 384. 
323 Id. § 11.4, at 384-85 (footnote omitted). 
324 See supra notes 252-54 and accompanying text. 
325 SeeNOWAK&ROTUNDA, supra note 235, § 11.3, at380-81. 
326 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
327 See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 235, § 11.4, at 386. 
328 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
329 See id. at 485-86. 
330 See id. at482 (''We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, 
need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or 
social conditions."). 
331 See id. at 482-83. 
332 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Meyer involved a challenge to a 
Nebraska statute that made it unlawful to" 'teach any subject to any person in any 
language other than the English language.'" Id. at 397. The Supreme Court 
concluded that the statute violated the parents' liberty interest in controlling their 
children's education, as well as the teacher's liberty interest in pursuing his chosen 
vocation. See id. at400-01. 
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v. Society ofSisters333 as support for his proposition that the Constitution 
extended protection to rights found within its penumbras.334 Yet, both 
Meyer and Pierce were substantive due process cases, in which the Court 
granted fundamental rights status to the ability of parents to control their 
children's education. As Justice Black noted in his dissent in Griswold, 
"the reasoning stated in Meyer and Pierce was the same natural law due 
process philosophy which many later opinions repudiated, and which I 
cannot accept. "335 
Notwithstanding Justice Black's objections to the application of 
substantive due process to social legislation, in various cases since 
Griswold, the Supreme Court has evaluated the substantive fairness of state 
statutes that prohibited abortion,336 required court approval prior to 
marriage for persons delinquent in child support,337 criminalized consensual 
homosexual activity,338 and restricted the right to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment.339 Several Justices have expressed concern about applying 
substantive due process because of the possibility that the Court may 
mistakenly impose personal values rather than undertake a constitutional 
analysis. 
When the Court ventures further and defines as "fundamental" liberties 
that are nowhere mentioned in the Constitution (or that are present only 
in the so-called "penumbras" of specifically enumerated rights), it must, 
of necessity, act with more caution, lest it open itself to the accusation 
that, in the name of identifying constitutional principles to which the 
people have consented in framing their Constitution, the Court has done 
nothing more than impose its own controversial choices of value upon the 
people.340 
333 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). In Pierce, the Society of 
Sisters, which operated Roman Catholic schools, challenged an Oregon statute 
requiring students from ages 8 to 16 to attend public schools. The Supreme Court 
found the statute unconstitutional, concluding it ''unreasonably interfere[ d] with the 
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children 
under their control." Id. at 534-35. 
334 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at482-83. 
335 Id. at 516 (Black, J., dissenting). 
336 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
337 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
338 See B.owers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
339 See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
340Thomburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476U.S. 
7 4 7, 790 ( 1986) (White, J., dissenting), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833 (1992). Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in White's dissent in 
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The continuing debate over the use of substantive due process and the 
parameters of that doctrine shape constitutional analysis involving 
fundamental rights. The manner in which a Justice frames the legal issue 
in a case provides some evidence of the Justice's comfort level with the 
doctrine of substantive due process. How the issue is framed, in tum, 
affects the outcome of the case. Nowhere is this more evident than in the 
Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.341 
In Bowers, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a 
Georgia statute that made consensual sodomy a criminal offense.342 
Hardwick, the criminal defendant, had been arrested for engaging in 
sodomy in his own home with another man. In a five-to-four decision, the 
Court found that the statute did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Due Process Clause.343 
The majority opinion, authored by Justice White, framed the issue as 
''whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon 
homosexuals to engage in sodomy."344 The majority then set forth the 
standards traditionally used by the Court to determine what constitutes a 
fundamental right. First, fundamental rights include those "liberties that are 
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor 
justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed.' "345 Second, those liberties 
that are" 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition'" are also 
protected as fundamental rights.346 
In enunciating the Supreme Court's standards for determining the 
existence of a fundamental right, the majority appeared to question the 
legitimacy of the Court's traditional approach. 
Striving to assure itself and the public that announcing rights not 
readily identifiable in the Constitution's text involves much more than the 
imposition of the Justices' own choice of values on the States and the 
Federal Government, the Court has sought to identify the nature of the 
rights qualifying for heightened judicial protection. 347 
This language certainly does not suggest a wholehearted endorsement of 
the Court's substantive due process analysis. Nevertheless, the majority did 
Thornburgh. 
341 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
342 See id. at 188 n.1 (citing GA. CODE ANN.§ 16-6-2 (1984)). 
343 See id. at 196. 
344 Id. at 190. 
345 Id. at 191-92. 
346 Id. at 192 (citations omitted). 
347 Id. at 191. 
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not expressly renounce the Court's standards for substantive due process 
review, because it easily concluded that the "right [of] homosexuals to 
engage in sodomy''348 satisfied neither of the Court's tests for fundamental 
rights. "It is obvious to us that neither of these formulations would extend 
a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual 
sodomy. Proscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots."349 
The majority in Bowers, however, treated the two categories of 
fundamental rights as if they were one. Historical evidence showing the 
prevalence of anti-sodomy laws worked not only to demonstrate that the 
right to engage in consensual sodomy was not deeply rooted in national 
history, but also to show that the right was not subsumed within the concept 
of ordered liberty.350 If the Court's formulation of fundamental rights 
includes those rights that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"351 
then ordered liberty must mean something different than those rights that 
are deeply rooted in national history. Otherwise, it is unnecessary to use the 
ordered liberty test in determining fundamental rights. 
By collapsing the ordered liberty test into the historical test and by 
formulating the issue narrowly, the majority in Bowers guaranteed that it 
would not recognize as fundamental the right to engage in homosexual 
sodomy. After all, according to the historical analysis in Bowers, the right 
to engage in homosexual activity has never been recognized in the United 
States. But many states have penalized other activities, such as miscegena-
tion, that the Supreme Court has found to be constitutionally invalid. 352 The 
question is why the Court reached a different result in Bowers v. Hardwick. 
The answer lies, in part, with the discomfort that some Justices 
experience in substantively reviewing legislation. If a right is fundamental, 
then the Court must apply strict scrutiny.353 That, in turn, means that the 
Court most likely will strike the legislation down as unconstitutional. The 
Court, however, avoids this dilemma by not recognizing a right as 
348 Id. at 190. 
349 Id. at 192 (citation omitted). 
350 See id. at 192-94. 
351 Id. at 191. 
352 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). In his dissent inBower.s v. Hardwick, 
Justice Stevens noted that "miscegenation was once treated as a crime similar to 
sodomy." Bower.s, 478 U.S. at216 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
353 See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American CollegeofObstetricians & Gynecologists, 
476 U.S. 747, 789 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (stating "[o]nly 'fundamental' 
rights are entitled to the added protection provided by strict judicial scrutiny") 
(citations omitted), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992). 
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fundamental. It is clear that the majority's uneasiness with substantive due 
process drove the result in Bowers. 
Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority 
to discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause. 
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it 
deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable 
roots in the language or design of the Constitution. That this is so was 
painfully demonstrated by the face-off between the Executive and the 
Court in the 1930's, which resulted in the repudiation of much of the 
substantive gloss that the Court had placed on the Due Process Clauses of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. There should be, therefore, great 
resistance to expand the substantive reach of those Clauses, particularly 
if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamen-
tal.3S4 
This exegesis on the dangers of substantive due process followed on the 
heels of the majority's rejection of the right to engage in homosexual 
sodomy as a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Due Process Clause.355 
Had the majority in Bowers defined the issue as whether a state may 
interfere with an individual's choice of how to conduct himself in his 
intimate relationships, the Court may have reached a different result. The 
dissenting opinion made this clear. 
This case is no more about "a fundamental right to engage in 
homosexual sodomy," as the Court purports to declare, ante, at 191, than 
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), was about a fundamental right 
to watch obscene movies, or Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), 
was about a fundamental right to place interstate bets from a telephone 
booth. Rather, this case is about "the most comprehensive of rights and 
the right most valued by civilized men," namely, the "right to be let 
alone. "356 
As the dissenters aptly noted, the Georgia statute at issue in Bowers v. 
Hardwick penalized sodomy, not just homosexual sodomy.357 Yet, the 
354 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95. 
355 See id. at 192-94. 
356 Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
357 See id. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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majority framed the issue in terms of homosexual activity, not consensual 
sodomy. 358 The dissenters argued that the real issue in the case involved the 
values underlying the right of privacy. If the state could invade the 
bedroom of a homosexual man, then what prevented the state from doing 
so to penalize heterosexual sodomy? The dissenters claimed that the right 
to personal privacy extended to certain individual decisions, as well as to 
particular private places.359 In Hardwick's case, the state not only intruded 
into decisions about his private sexual activity, it did so within the confines 
ofhis home. Thus, for the dissent, the real danger in the Bowers holding lay 
in "depriving individuals of the right to choose for themselves how to 
conduct their intimate relationships [which] poses a far greater threat to the 
values most deeply rooted in our Nation's history than tolerance of 
nonconformity could ever do."360 
The debate over substantive due process continues unabated. On the 
current Court, Justice Scalia is perhaps the most vocal critic of the dangers 
of substantive due process review. As a result, he holds a restrictive view 
of those rights deemed to be fundamental. In his concurring opinion in 
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department ofHealth,361 he wrote separately 
to explain his view that the right to commit suicide is not fundamental. As 
a result, it was ''unnecessary to reopen the historically recurrent debate over 
whether 'due process' includes substantive restrictions."362 In Scalia's 
dissenting opinion in Casey, he attacked the use of substantive due process 
to reaffirm Roe. Labeling the plurality's rationales as a meaningless 
''parade of adjectives,"363 Justice Scalia concluded that the decision in 
Casey resulted not from "reasonedjudgment,"364 the hallmark of substan-
358 See id. at 192. 
359 See id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
360 Id. at 214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
361 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). Cruzan is 
known as the "right to die" case. The issue in Cruzan was whether the parents of 
Nancy Cruzan, who was in a permanent vegetative state, could authorize the 
withdrawal of life-sustaining food and water. See id. at 269. The Court assumed 
that the Constitution protected the right of competent persons to refuse life-
sustaining food and water; however, it concluded that Missouri could require clear 
and convincing evidence of Nancy Cruzan's wish to discontinue food and water 
before allowing this action, a burden which had not been met See id. at 282-85. 
362 Id. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
363 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 983 n.2 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
364 Id. at 982-84 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The term 
"reasoned judgment" refers to Justice Harlan's famous dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 
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tive due process review, but from "personal predilection"365 alone. Justice 
Scalia's dissent in Casey captures the persistent concern about substantive 
due process: the Court, in evaluating the substantive fairness oflegislation, 
will impose its own values, rather than adhering to constitutional princi-
ples. 
Justice Scalia is not alone in his views. Chief Justice Rehnquist,366 
Justice Thomas, and Justice White joined in Justice Scalia's dissent in 
Casey.361 In. Thornburgh v.American College of Obstetricians & Gynecolo-
gists,368 a case involving challenges to a Pennsylvania statute imposing 
certain restrictions on abortion, then Justice Rehnquist joined in Justice 
White's dissenting opinion.369 Justice White expressed concern, once again, 
about the Court wandering too far afield in its substantive due process case 
law.37° ChiefJustice Rehnquist also formed part of the five-person majority 
in Bowers that narrowly defined the interest at stake as the right to engage 
in homosexual sodomy.371 
In its recent decision in Washington v. Glucksberg,312 the Court 
revisited the issue of substantive due process. Chief Justice Rehnquist 
authored the Court's opinion, in which Justices O'Connor, Scalia, 
Kennedy, and Thomas joined. G/ucksberginvolvedadueprocess challenge 
to a Washington statute that made it illegal to assist a person in committing 
suicide.373 The Court began its analysis of the statute by recognizing that 
the term "liberty'' in the Due Process Clause has a substantive 
component.374 Nonetheless, the Court cautioned that "extending constitu-
tional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, ... place[s] the 
367 U.S. 497, 542-544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
365 Casey, 505 U.S. at 984 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
366 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a separate dissent in Casey, in which Justices 
White, Scalia and Thomas also joined. See id. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
367 See id. at 979 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
368 Thomburghv.AmericanCollegeofObstetricians&Gynecologists,476U.S. 
747 (1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
369 See id. at 785 (White, J., dissenting). 
370 See id. at 790 (White, J., dissenting) ("When the Court ventures further and 
defmes as 'fundamental' liberties that are nowhere mentioned in the Constitution 
... it must, of necessity, act with more caution[.]"). 
371 See supra notes 344-52 and accompanying text. 
3n Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct 2258 (1997). 
373 See id. at 2261 (citing WASH. REV. CODE§ 9A.36.060(1) {1994)). 
374 See id. at 2267. · 
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matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action.'ms In order 
to protect against such an eventuality, the Court added a requirement to the 
traditional test for fundamental rights. In addition to asking whether a 
liberty interest is deeply rooted in national traditions or implicit in ordered 
liberty, the Court also must "'careful[ly] descri[be]' ... the asserted 
fundamental liberty interest. "376 
However, a careful description may amount to an attempt to evade 
substantive review of legislative choices. This is what the majority did in 
Bowers by narrowly defining the interest at stake. Similarly, in Glucksberg, 
the Court defined the interest not as ''the right to die with dignity," as 
suggested by Justice Breyer in his concurrence,377 but rather as the "right 
to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so."378 
Framing the issue in this manner, once again, guaranteed that the Court 
would find no fundamental right. Historically, assisted suicide has been a 
crime, and in most jurisdictions, it continues to carry criminal penalties. 379 
However, as Justice Breyer noted, "our legal tradition [might] provide 
greater support" for the "right to die with dignity" than the "right to 
commit suicide with another's assistance."380 
The debate over substantive due process has not ended. As challenges 
to federal and state cloning legislation begin, the Court will once again 
have to venture into the thorny thicket of its substantive due process case 
law. Clearly, the way in which the Court frames the issue will shape the 
result. 
2. The Abortion Debate 
Any analysis of cloning legislation requires an examination of the 
Court's abortion decisions. Both embryo splitting and nuclear transplanta-
tion cloning, whether involving human embryonic or adult cells, involve 
research on and manipulation of human embryos. In fact, a critical 
375 Id. at 2267-68. 
376 Id. at 2268. 
377 I d. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment 
in Glucksberg because the challenged statute did not force dying patients to sustain 
"severe physical pain (connected with death), [which] would have to comprise an 
essential part of any successful claim" based upon a fundamental right argument 
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). 
378 Id. at 2269 (footnote omitted). 
379 See id. at 2262-67. 
380 Id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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difference between the CPA and the Feinstein/K.ennedy Act, on the one 
hand, and the Bond/Lott Act, on the other, is the prohibition on research 
involving embryos.381 As a result, the Court's pronouncements on abortion 
will figure prominently in the evaluation of any anti-cloning legislation. 
a. The Road to Casey 
In 1973, in a seven-to-two opinion,' the Supreme Court in Roe v. 
Wade382 struck down as unconstitutional a Texas statute that made it a 
crime to obtain an abortion. The Court did so on the basis of a right to 
privacy grounded in the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.383 Noting that "privacy" is nowhere mentioned in 
the Constitution, the majority explained that the Constitution nonetheless 
"guarantee[ s] ... certain areas or zones of privacy,"384 but only with regard 
to those "personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty.' "385 Drawing on a line of cases recognizing 
the fundamental right of parents to control the rearing and education of 
their children,386 the right to procreation,387 and the right ofmarried388 or 
single persons389 to use contraceptives, the Court found that ''the right of 
personal privacy includes the abortion decision."390 By granting the 
decision to have an abortion the status of a fundamental right, the Court 
required states to demonstrate that their statutory restrictions on abortion 
381 See supra Part II.B.2. 
382 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
383 See id. at 153. 
384 Id. at 152. 
385 Id. (citation omitted). 
386 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390 (1923); supra notes 332-33. 
387 See Skinnerv. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Skinner involved a challenge 
to an Oklahoma statute that mandated sterilization for those persons who had been 
convicted of two or more "felonies involving moral turpitude." Id. at 536. The 
Court held the statute to be unconstitutional, finding that "[m]arriage and 
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." I d. at 
541. 
388 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
389 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy 
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a 
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.") (citations omitted). 
390 Roe, 410 U.S. at 15~. 
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satisfy the strict scrutiny test.391 Because the Court concluded, however, 
that the unborn did not fall within the term "'person' as used in the 
Fourteenth Amendment,"392 the state's interest in the potential life of the 
fetus did not outweigh the woman's liberty interest in deciding whether to 
have an abortion.393 Nonetheless, the Court rejected the argument that a 
woman has an absolute right to an abortion. Instead, it adopted the 
controversial trimester approach, finding that the state's dual interests in 
maternal health and the potential life of the fetus become compelling at the 
end of the first trimester for maternal health and at the point of viability for 
fetal life. 394 
Roe certainly did not resolve the debate over abortion. On the contrary, 
the debate intensified. In the years following Roe, the Supreme Court has 
addressed a number of state statutes that place restrictions on the decision 
to have an abortion. In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,395 the Court 
addressed questions that were left unanswered by its decision in Roe about 
the proper scope of state legislation restricting the right to abortion. In 
Danforth, the Court found unconstitutional several provisions of a Missouri 
statute that required, among other things, married women and minors to 
obtain written spousal consent and written parental consent, respectively, 
for abortions conducted in the first trimester.396 A year later, in Maher v. 
Roe, 397 in a six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court upheld a Connecticut 
Welfare Department regulation that restricted the use ofMedicaid funds to 
only those abortions deemed to be medically necessary, concluding that a 
state need not "show a compelling interest for its policy choice to favor 
normal childbirth."398 
In 1988, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,399 the Supreme 
Court passed on the constitutionality of a Missouri statute placing 
restrictions on the right to procure an abortion. In the thirteen years since 
its decision in Danforth, however, the Court's composition had changed. 
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy had replaced Justice Stewart, 
Chief Justice Burger, and Justice Powell, respectively. The replacement of 
391 See id. at 155. 
392 Id. at 158. 
393 See id. at 162-63. 
394 See id. 
395 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
396 See id. at 67-75. 
397 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
398 Id. at 477. 
399 Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
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Justices Stewart and Powell, who had joined the majority's opinion in 
Danforth, affected the outcome in Webster. In an opinion authored by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court in Webster upheld a statutory prohibi-
tion on the use of public facilities to conduct abortions.400 More. important 
to any analysis of anti-cloning legislation was the Court's treatment of the 
preamble to Missouri's statute, which stated that"' [t]he life of each human 
being begins at conception.' "401 The Court did not rule on whether the 
preamble violated the Constitution because it determined that the 
preamble's language did not interfere with the decision to obtain an 
abortion.402 "Certainly the preamble does not by its terms regulate abortion 
.... The Court has emphasized that Roe v. Wade 'implies no limitation on 
the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over 
abortion.' The preamble can be read simply to express that sort of value 
judgment. '>403 
The Court is correct that the preamble to Missouri's statute did not 
actually affect a woman's right to have an abortion. As a legal matter, Roe 
provides that the fetus is not a "person" for purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.404 Of course, that does not mean that the fetus is not a 
"person" for purposes of state law. However, "offer[ing] protections to 
unborn children in tort and probate law•>4os is not the same as stating that 
life begins at conception. For example, the traditional rule in tort law only 
allowed recovery for wrongful death of a viable fetus.406 This rule is 
consistent with Roe's trimester analysis and the recognition that the state's 
interest in fetal life becomes compelling at viability. Webster's language, 
however, opened the door to states according protections in tort law to 
nonviable fetuses. The problem is that while distinctions between the rights 
of the unborn under federal versus state law may be legally consistent, they 
are philosophically inconsistent. To the average person, such distinctions 
mean that the fetus is not a person when a woman wishes to have an 
abortion, but may be a person if a woman loses the fetus due to some third 
party's negligent act. 
400 See id. at 521-22. 
401 Id. at 504 (citation omitted). 
402 See id. at 506. 
403 Id. (quoting Maherv. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,474 (1977)). 
404 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). 
405 Webster, 492 U.S. at 506. 
406 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
§55, at367-70 (5thed.1984); WilliamJ.Maledon,Note, The Law and the Unborn 
Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NOTRE DAME LAw. 349, 354-61 
(1971). 
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At a minimum, the majority's ruling in Webster regarding the language 
of the Missouri preamble reveals an uneasiness with the decision in Roe. 
Even though a plurality of the Court reaffirmed Roe in Casey, the decision 
reflects the continued uneasiness that certain members of the Court feel 
about the Roe decision. In turn, that discomfort will shape the direction of 
any ruling on the constitutionality of anti-cloning legislation. 
b. Planned Parenthood v. Casey 
In 1992, in a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court reaffirmedRoe' s 
"recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before 
viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State.'>407 The 
majority justified its decision on two grounds: the dictates of substantive 
due process and respect for the doctrine of stare decisis. The Court's 
opinion, authored by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, noted that 
the Constitution protects the decision to have an abortion as a fundamental 
right affecting personal privacy. 
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions 
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, 
child rearing, and education. Our cases recognize "the right of the 
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental 
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child." ... These matters, involving the most 
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices 
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the 
right to defme one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters 
could not defme the attributes of personhood were they formed under 
compulsion of the State.408 
This resounding endorsement of the principles of substantive due 
process, however, did not translate into a similarly resounding endorsement 
of the decision in Roe. While a majority of the Court reaffirmed Roe's 
essential holding, the authors of the majority opinion-Justices O'Connor, 
407 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). For a general 
discussion of abortion law and an analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Casey, seeNOWAK&ROTUNDA,supranote 235, § 14.29, at809-47. 
408 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (citations omitted). 
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Kennedy, and Souter-appeared to do so more out of respect for stare 
decisis than out of the conviction that substantive due process commanded 
the result in Roe. 
On the other side of the equation is the interest of the State in the 
protection of potential life. The Roe Court recognized the State's 
"important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human 
life." The weight to be given this state interest, not the strength of the 
woman's interest, was the difficult question faced in Roe. We do not need 
to say whether each of us, had we been Members of the Court when the 
valuation of the state interest came before it as an original matter, would 
have concluded, as the Roe Court did, that its weight is insufficient to 
justify a ban on abortions prior to viability even when it is subject to 
certain exceptions. The matter is not before us in the first instance, and 
coming as it does after nearly 20 years of litigation in Roe's wake we are 
satisfied that the immediate question is not the soundness of Roe's 
resolution of the issue, but the precedential force that must be accorded 
to its holding.409 
What is significant, for purposes of evaluating the constitutionality of 
anti-cloning legislation, is the uncertainty that Justices O'Connor, 
Kennedy, and Souter expressed about the soundness of the Roe Court's 
balancing of the state's interest against the liberty interest of the woman. 
They intimated that had they been members of the Roe Court, they may 
have struck this balance in a different manner. Even though they chose not 
to revisit that balancing of interests in Roe, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, 
and Souter did criticize the failure of the Court to adequately evaluate the 
state's interests in potential human life, as required by Roe. 
The woman's liberty is not so unlimited, however, that from the outset the 
State cannot show its concern for the life of the unborn, and at a later 
point in fetal development the State's interest in life has sufficient force 
so that the right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy can be 
restricted.410 
This concern for the state's interests in the potentiality of human life led 
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in Casey to reject Roe's contro-
versial trimester approach, viewing it "as a rigid prohibition on all 
409 I d. at 871 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
410 Id. at 869. 
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previability regulation aimed at the protection offetallife."411 In addition, 
the authors of the joint opinion adopted an ''undue burden" standard for 
evaluating abortion regulations. That standard falls somewhere between the 
rational basis and strict scrutiny tests and invalidates abortion restrictions 
that erect a substantial obstacle to a woman's exercise of the right to 
abortion with respect to a nonviable fetus.412 
The dissenters in Casey argued that "Roe was wrongly decided" and 
"should be overruled.'>413 In his dissent, Justice Scalia noted that the 
decision to allow abortion is best left to the legislative branch.414 The 
significance of the dissenting opinions for any constitutional evaluation of 
anti-cloning legislation lies in the dissenters' distinctions between abortion 
and other fundamental rights. Chief Justice Rehnquist views the decision 
to abort as "'different in kind' •>4Is from other privacy rights, such as those 
involving procreation and contraception, because it "necessarily involves 
the destruction of a fetus.'>416 Justice Scalia stated the distinction even more 
forcefully: "[T]he best the Court can do to explain how it is that the word 
'liberty' must be thought to include the right to destroy human fetuses is to 
rattle off a collection of adjectives that simply decorate a value judgment 
· and conceal a political choice.'>417 The significance of the dissenting 
opinions in Casey lies not so much in the critique of substantive due 
process, but rather in the dissenters' views on abortion. The Casey 
dissenters argue that even accepting the legitimacy of substantive due 
process review, the decision to abort a human fetus should not be protected 
as a fundamental right. 
411 Id. at 873. 
412 See id. at 877. The dissent resoundingly criticized the authors of the joint 
opinion for adopting the "undue burden" standard. However, some commentators 
view Casey's undue burden standard as "the logical outcome of the Court's 
gradual, but meaningful, shift concerning a woman's right to an abortion between 
the early 1970s and the early 1990s." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 235, § 
14.29, at 822. 
413 Casey, 505 U.S. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
414 See id. at 979 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
415 !d. at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation 
omitted). 
416 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations 
omitted). 
417 Id. at 983 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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3. Cloning and Fundamental Rights Analysis 
The CPA, the Bond/Lott Act, and the Feinstein/Kennedy Act do not 
completely bar the use of cloning for "reproductive" purposes because all 
three allow embryo splitting.418 Yet, even if they did bar such activity, it is 
unlikely that the current Court would find such federal legislation 
unconstitutional. First, at least three members of the Court have written or 
joined in decisions that suggest the Court should exercise caution in 
recognizing new fundamental rights.419 Second, a majority of the Justices 
either have said that Roe was wrongly decided or have implied that they 
would have ruled differently had they been members of the Roe Court.420 
In order to strike down federal cloning legislation as unconstitutional, the 
Court would have to recognize the decision to clone as a fundamental right 
and conclude that the government's countervailing interest in banning 
cloning technology is not compelling. Given the predilections of the 
Justices on the current Court, neither is likely to happen. 
a. Cloning as a Fundamental Right 
In Glucksberg, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the Court needs to 
proceed with caution when considering the creation of new fundamental 
rights. According to Rehnquist, the absence of clear "'guideposts for 
responsible decisionmaking' ' 0421 justified a more limited judicial approach 
to substantive due process review. Rehnquist explained that a "'careful 
description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest'0422 was necessary; 
otherwise, the Court might use the amorphous standards of substantive due 
process to replace legislative policy judgments with its own. 
418 The major distinction among the bills is the ban on cloning research. Both 
the CPA and the Feinstein/Kennerly Act only prohibit the actual creation of a 
human clone using nuclear transfer technology. See supra notes 226-34 and 
accompanying text. By comparison, the Bond/Lott Act bans both the creation of 
human clones, as well as cloning research, using nuclear transplantation. See supra 
Part II.B.2. This difference, however, is not significant for purposes of a Fifth 
Amendment Due Process analysis. The Bond/Lott Act may implicate the First 
Amendment by creating an overinclusive ban on scientific research. This Article 
does not address that issue. 
419 See supra notes 361-71 and accompanying text. 
420 See supra Part IV.A.2.b. 
421 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2268 (1977) (citation omitted). 
422 Id. 
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Chief Justice Rehnquist's formulation of the fundamental rights 
analysis garnered the votes of four other Justices on the Court. As a result, 
a five-person majority423 of the current Court agrees with Rehnquist that a 
required element of substantive due process review is a careful articulation 
of the interest at stake. 
Of course, a careful articulation of the interest is not necessarily bad; 
. however, in practice, a "narrow" framing of the asserted interest allows the 
Court to avoid substantive due process review. If a right is not deemed to 
be fundamental, the Court must only find that the state interest is legiti-
mate, not compelling.424 Thus, a careful description of asserted rights 
results in a narrow list of fundamental interests. For example, in Bowers, 
the five-person majority, which included then Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
O'Connor, framed the interest as the right of homosexuals to engage in 
consensual sodomy.425 In Cruzan, the Court assumed, for purposes of its 
decision, that a mentally competent person had a fundamental right to 
refuse food and water.426 However, the Court's assumption that such a 
fundamental right existed was grounded, not in more general notions of 
personal autonomy, but rather in the more narrow and traditional concerns 
about excessive government interference with bodily integrity.427 Finally, 
in Glucksberg, the Court described the interest as the right to assisted 
suicide, rather than the right to die with dignity, as suggested by Justice 
Breyer, who concurred in the Court's judgment.428 In both Bowers and 
Glucksberg, the narrower formulation meant that the Court did not 
recognize the asserted interest as fundamental. 
This is more than mere semantics. Because the fundamental rights 
analysis examines whether an asserted right is deeply grounded in national 
tradition, a narrow formulation of that right makes it more difficult to 
satisfy the traditional fundamental rights test. In fact, some of the rights 
423 Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined in Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's opinion. See id. at 2260-61. 
424 SeeNOWAK&ROTUNDA,supra note 235, § 14.3, at 600-02,606. 
425 See supra notes 344-52 and accompanying text 
426 See supra note 361. 
427 The Court made this distinction about the decision in Cruzan in its 
G/ucksberg decision. See G/ucksberg, 117 S. Ct at 2269-70. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist authored both decisions, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and 
Kennedy. See id. at 2260-61; Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 
261, 264 (1990). Justice Thomas, who was not a member of the Court at the time 
of the Cruzan decision, joined the Court's opinion in Glucksberg. Justice White 
was the fifth member of the Cruzan majority. See id. at 264. 
428 See supra notes 377-80 and accompanying text. 
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now recognized as fundamental, if narrowly drawn, certainly would not 
have survived the historical test. Contraception was not a common practice 
in the early days ofthis country's founding, and sex outside of marriage 
certainly is not a right deeply grounded in national tradition. Nonetheless, 
the Supreme Court has held that government intrusion into the decision to 
use contraceptives violates the fundamental rights of both married429 and 
single430 persons. The distinction lies in the manner in which the Court 
framed the issue in the contraceptive cases. Rather than ask whether a 
single woman has the right to use contraceptives, the Court held that the 
right of privacy includes the right "to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the 
decision whether to bear or beget a child.'>431 
So how might the Court describe the asserted interest in a challenge to 
cloning legislation? There are two obvious possibilities. Embryo splitting 
and nuclear transplantation involving embryonic cells could be compared 
to in vitro fertilization, which is a treatment for infertility. Thus, the Court 
could frame the asserted interest as the decision whether to bear or beget 
children ortherightto procreation. Alternatively, the Court could narrowly 
describe the interest as the right to engage in cloning. The latter formula-
tion (or some variant thereof) is more likely, given the Court's recent 
pronouncements on substantive due process. Such a narrow articulation of 
the interest means that the Court will determine that the right to clone is not 
fundamental. First, there is no deeply rooted national tradition recognizing 
cloning because it is a radical new technology. Second, denying fundamen-
tal rights to cloning will not sacrifice liberty or justice and, thus, will not 
violate the concept of ordered liberty. 
Even in the unlikely event that the Supreme Court were to recognize 
a fundamental right to have access to some or all cloning technology, the 
Court, at a minimum, would sustain the CPA and the Feinstein/Kennerly 
Act as constitutional. Once the Court recognizes a right as fundamental, 
legislation "limiting [that] right may be justified only by a 'compelling 
state interest,'" that is "'narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate 
state interests at stake.' '>432 The CPA and the Feinstein/Kennerly Act would 
easily satisfy the strict scrutiny test. First, the NBAC has recognized that 
there are serious questions about the safety of cloning. 
429 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
430 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
431 Id. at453 (citations omitted). 
432 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (citations omitted). 
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At present, the use of [somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning] to create a 
child would be a premature experiment that exposes the developing child 
to unacceptable risks. This in itself is sufficient to justify a prohibition on 
cloning human beings at this time, even if such efforts were to. be 
characterized as the exercise of a fundamental right to attempt to 
procreate. 433 
Second, the prohibitions in the CPA and theFeinstein!Kennedy Act, though 
not necessarily those in the Bond/LottAct,434 are narrowly drawn to address 
the government interest in safety. Both Acts only prohibit the actual 
implantation of a clone in order to create a newborn human. Neither 
penalizes cloning research, and both expire after a certain time period. 
Thus, neither act imposes a permanent ban on the technology.435 
b. The Impact of the Abortion Decisions 
The abortion controversy will no doubt play a major role in the Court's 
analysis of federal cloning legislation. All forms of cloning involve 
experimentation on embryos. Embryo splitting entails the separation of 
early embryonic cells in order to create multiple copies of the original 
embryo.436 Nuclear transfer, whether of the nucleus of adult or embryonic 
cells, will result in the creation of a human embryo, many of which will not 
survive or even be implanted. IfDr. Wilmut' s experiment is any indication, 
hundreds of thousands of embryos will be created and destroyed in the 
process of perfecting human cloning techniques. It took Dr. Wilmut 277 
tries before he successfully created the clone known as "Dolly.'>437 And, in 
the year since Dolly's announcement, no other scientist has been able to 
repeat Dr. Wilmut's success.438 
433 CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 108. 
434 If the Court applied a fundamental rights analysis to cloning, the Bond/Lott 
Act might be found unconstitutional because it reaches too far. The Act bans both 
the creation of human clones, as well as human cloning research. There are clear 
safety risks in creating a human clone at this time. It is less clear that there are 
safety risks involved in human cloning research. Research implicates moral and 
ethical questions about the status of the embryo. Therefore, a claim asserting the 
right to engage in cloning research based on the First Amendment may succeed if 
the Court recognizes a protected interest in the right to engage in scientific inquiry. 
435 See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text 
436 See supra Part I.A.1.c. 
437 See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. 
438 See Nicholas Wade, With No Other 'Dollys, 'Cloning Report Draws Critics, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1998, atA8. 
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Destruction ofhuman embryos implicates issues similar to those in the 
abortion decisions. Three of the Court's current members-Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas-"believe that Roe was wrongly 
decided" and "should be overruled.'0439 They conclude that the right to an 
abortion differs from personal decisions involving "marriage, procreation, 
and contraception [because] abortion 'involves the purposeful termination 
of a potential life.' ' 0440 For these three Justices, abortion is not a fundamen-
tal right. 
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, in their joint opinion in 
Casey, reaffirmed Roe's basic holding regarding a woman's right to have 
an abortion prior to fetal viability.441 Thus, they recognized the right to 
abortion as a fundamental right. At the same time, however, they intimated 
that had they been on the Roe Court, they may have given more weight to 
''the interest of the State in the protection of potentiallife.'>«2 Justices 
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter noted that the "difficult question faced in 
Roe'>«3 was the balancing of the state's and the woman's interest. The 
state's interest is "its concern for the life of the unbom.'0444 The woman's 
interest is twofold: (1) protection of ''the liberty relating to intimate 
relationships, the family, and decisions about whether or not to beget or 
bear a child"445 and (2) ''protection of personal autonomy and bodily 
integrity.'0446 
Cloning, unlike abortion, does not implicate this second interest in 
bodily integrity. Cloning occurs outside the body. A woman need never 
agree to reimplantation of a cloned embryo. Thus, cloning legislation, 
unlike a restrictive abortion statute, does not compel a woman to carry a 
fetus to term. This is an important distinction because it eliminates one 
justification for recognizing a fundamental right to abortion. In Casey, 
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter implied that the state's interest in 
potential life would have sufficed to ''justify a ban on abortions prior to 
viability'>«7 had they decided the Roe case. Why, then, would they find 
unconstitutional legislation that advances the government's interest in 
439 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 944 (1992) (R.ehnquist, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
440 Id. at 952 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980)). 
441 See id. at 846. 
442 Id. at 871. 
443 Id. 
444 Id. at 869. 
445 I d. at 857 (citations omitted). 
446 Id. 
447 Id. at 871. 
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potential human life in a case in which th~re is no affirmative government 
interference with bodily integrity? 
Thus, it appears that six of the current Justices will not extend the 
Court's fundamental liberty protection to the decision to use cloning as a 
form of"reproduction." The reasons articulated by individual Justices for 
doing so will vary. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas may ground 
their decision either on their opposition to expanding substantive due 
process review, their disagreement with the Roe decision, or some 
combination of these two lines of reasoning. Chief Justice Rehnquist has 
long opposed an expansion of substantive due process review. He joined 
Justice White's majority decision in Bowers, which narrowly defined the 
asserted liberty interest as the right to engage in homosexual sodomy.448 In 
Thornburgh, he joined Justice White's dissent, which argued that although 
the right to an abortion "is a species of 'liberty' ... this liberty is [not] so 
'fundamental' that restrictions upon it call into play anything more than the 
most minimal judicial scrutiny.'~9 In his concurring opinion in Cruzan, 
Justice Scalia forcefully argued that "federal courts [had] no business',.;so 
making constitutional decisions about matters that properly belong before 
state legislatures. He likened the controversy over the "right to die" to that 
over the right to abortion and expressed concern lest the Court travel down 
the same disastrous path opened up by its decision in Roe. Finally, in 
Casey, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas called for 
Roe to be overruled.451 The three Justices criticized Roe as an undue 
expansion of fundamental rights analysis,452 which strongly suggests that 
they would not extend to cloning the protection of fundamental rights 
status. 
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter also are unlikely to extend 
fundamental rights protection to cloning, but they will decline to do so for 
different reasons. In their joint opinion in Casey, the three Justices defined 
liberty in the sweeping terms of the "right to define one's own concept of 
448 See supra notes 344-52 and accompanying text 
449 Thomburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476U.S. 
747,790 (1986) (White, J., dissenting), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
505 u.s. 833 (1992). 
45° Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990) (Scalia, 
J., concurring). 
451 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). 
452 See id. at 951-53 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
id. at 982-84 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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. 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery ofhuman life.'>453 
This language suggests that the authors of the joint opinion might recognize 
access to cloning as subsumed within the concept of liberty. After all, 
cloning raises questions about individuality, the role of the person, and the 
mystery of life. Despite the grand language in Casey, however, Justices 
O'Connor and Kennedy joined in Chief Justice Rehnquist's Glucksberg 
opinion, which expressed concern over unduly expanding substantive due 
process review.454 Justice Souter concurred in the judgment in Glucksberg, 
but wrote separately in order to articulate a vision of substantive due 
process different from that expressed by the majority.455 
This uncertainty regarding what Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and 
Souter consider as the proper scope of substantive review, however, does 
not preclude intelligent predictions about how they might rule in a due 
process challenge to cloning legislation. All three Justices indicate some 
uneasiness about Roe's balancing of the state's interest in protecting the 
unborn. This interest also exists with cloning, albeit at an earlier stage of 
development. With respect to cloning, the woman does not have a 
countervailing interest in bodily integrity. In addition, the government has 
an interest in ensuring the safety of the procedure for children born through 
cloning. Thus, it is likely that the authors of the joint opinion will find that 
the state's interest in protecting the potential life of the unborn, as well as 
ensuring the safety of cloned children, outweighs any interest that an 
individual may have to reproduce using cloning technology. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Federal efforts to ban cloning will survive scrutiny under both the 
Commerce Clause456 and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.457 
First, Lopez does not appear to be a radical departure from prior Commerce 
Clause case law. Justice Kennedy's concurrence suggests caution in 
discarding decades of Supreme Court precedent to return to an antiquated 
notion of economic relations.458 Second, even as it stands, Lopez is 
distinguishable from current federal efforts to ban cloning. The proscribed 
453 Id. at 851. 
454 See supra notes 372-76 and accompanying text 
455 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275 (1997) (Souter, J., 
concurring). · 
456 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
457 Id. amend. V. 
458 See supra notes 274-77 and accompanying text. 
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activity in Lopez, though criminal in nature, involved intrastate, noncom-
mercial behavior.459 Cloning, on the other hand, involves interstate 
commerce, possibly interstate travel, and commercial activity. Therefore, 
even thoughLopezmay give pause to constitutional-scholars in terms of the 
future of Commerce Clause litigation, it seems to provide no major 
impediment to current efforts by Congress to ban cloning. 
The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause also poses no impediment 
to federal anti-cloning legislation. First, it is unlikely that the Court will 
hold that cloning constitutes a fundamental right. Even if the Court does so 
hold, the government interests involved in banning cloning are compelling. 
Cloning is not safe. In addition, the government has an important interest 
in potential human life, and, unlike abortion, there is no countervailing 
interference with a woman's liberty interest in controlling her body. 
Therefore, the current anti-cloning bills, if enacted into law, will survive 
scrutiny under the Commerce Clause and the Fifth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause. 
459 See supra notes 268-70 and accompanying text. 
